HackerReposA FIELD GUIDE TO OPEN SOURCE
ProSponsor the shelf♧ 0
← Back to top all-time
ag2ai
ag2
Python2024–2025
ag2ai / ag2

ag2

AG2 (formerly AutoGen): The Open-Source AgentOS.Join us at: https://discord.gg/sNGSwQME3x

3Distinct people
4Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
5.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

AG2 (formerly AutoGen): The Open-Source AgentOS.Join us at: https://discord.gg/sNGSwQME3x

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:56:07 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month4 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2024-11-14 00:16:20 UTC to 2025-09-25 02:37:01 UTC.

0122024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 2 submissions, 0 commentsNov 20242024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsApr 20252025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 commentsSep 2025

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Nov 20242024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC220
Dec 20242024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20252025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20252025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20252025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20252025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20252025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20252025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20252025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20252025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

4 sources
We built agents to test github repo quickstarts associated with arXiv papers a couple months before this paper was published, wrote about it publicly here: https://remyxai.substack.com/p/self-healing-repos We've been pushing it farther to implement draft PRs in your target repo, published a month before this preprint: https://remyxai.substack.com/p/paperswithprs To limit the attack surface we added PR#1929 to AG2 so we could pass API keys to the DockerCommandLineCodeExecutor but also use egress whitelisting to block the ability of an agent to reach a compromised server: https://github.com/ag2ai/ag2/pull/1929 Since then, we've been scaling this with k8s ray workers so we can run this in the cloud to build for the hundreds of papers published daily. By running in Docker, constraining the network interface, deploying on the cloud, and ultima
Read the rest
tely keeping humans-in-the-loop through PR review, it's hard to see where the prompt-injection attack comes into play from testing the code. Would love to get feedback from an expert on this, can you imagine an attack scenario, Simon? I'll need to work out a check for the case where someone creates a paper with code instructing my agent to publish keys to a public HF repo for others to exfiltrate.
In Paper2Agent: Stanford Reimagining Research Papers as Interactive AI Agents
No doubt, this toy demo will break your system if the research repo code runs unsecured code. We thought about this out as we built a system that goes beyond running the quickstart to implement the core-methods of arXiv papers as draft PRs for YOUR target repo. Running quickstart in sandbox is practically useless. To limit the attack surface we added PR#1929 to AG2 so we could pass API keys to the DockerCommandLineCodeExecutor and use egress whitelisting to limit the ability of an agent to reach out to a compromised server: https://github.com/ag2ai/ag2/pull/1929 Been talking publicly about this for at least a month before this publication, and along the way we've built up nearly 1K Docker images for arXiv paper code: https://hub.docker.com/u/remyxai We're close to seeing these images linked to the arXiv papers after PR#908 is merged: htt
Read the rest
ps://github.com/arXiv/arxiv-browse/pull/908 And we're actually doing a technical deep-dive with the AG2 team on our work tomorrow at 9am PST: https://calendar.app.google/3soCpuHupRr96UaF8
In Paper2Agent: Stanford Reimagining Research Papers as Interactive AI Agents

MAKE YOURSELF AT HOME

A few shortcuts

/
Search the collection
?
Open this guide
Esc
Close dialogs and navigation

Your saved repositories and interests stay in this browser.