pond

I think Pond had better-thought-out decoy traffic https://github.com/agl/pond with a statistical design and clients would always upload and download the same amount of data (so it was very hard to determine if they "got a message" or just checked and didn't get a message).

> ...self-at-home-hosted options pop up in this space around Tor onion services. See also: https://github.com/agl/pond With Snowflake bridges, apps can now connect to the Tor network from within a browser. Ref: https://snowflake.torproject.org/

For Signal, sealed sender in theory makes some progress towards fixing this problem[1] but given the service fundamentally uses a central server, you could pretty easily figure out who is messaging who. There was an experimental chat application called Ricochet[2] which used Tor hidden services to anonymise users' social graphs, but unfortunately that project is no longer developed for quite a while. Pond[3] was also a similar system (though it was designed to solve the email problem and also aimed to solve some of the timing attacks against Tor by being a delayed-message protocol). I personally use Matrix[4] on my own homesever which appears to be the most privacy-preserving choice these days -- only the homeservers involved in a conversation ever see the messages. Unfortunately a lot of people use matrix.org as their homeserver (meaning

Since Pond is hard to search for, [link attached][0]. [0]: https://github.com/agl/pond

Then they should work on something better - the same way they worked on this new STS standard. I think Adam Langley has already started such a project, but it's only been a "spare-time" project: https://github.com/agl/pond

You're free to re-implement the public-domain protocol[1] under your own license. Pond has a 3-clause BSD licensed Golang implementation[2] that Moxie even references in the Axolotl announcement blog post. 1: https://github.com/trevp/axolotl/wiki 2: https://github.com/agl/pond/tree/master/client/ratchet

Actually, they do share the same OTR [0], ie one can expect the same level of security. The real difference is the transport, as you stated. [0] https://github.com/agl/pond/commit/338395668fbb8a7819c0fccf5...

You might consider changing the name. There's a new crypto messaging project started by some folks at Google called Pond: https://pond.imperialviolet.org/ https://github.com/agl/pond It's pretty much impossible to avoid naming collisions for projects. :-/

> also, is code like this https://github.com/agl/pond/blob/master/server/server.go#L15... just extreme defensive programming? or is there some other reason for the check (eg is not everything locked)? That's checking for integer overflow - an often-overlooked source of many security vulnerabilities. That's a signed integer though, and I don't know if signed integer overflow has defined behavior in Go. In C that would be undefined behavior, allowing the compiler to do potentially nutty things, so you would want to do the overflow check before the increment. (Edit: considering who the author of this code is, I would assume that Go has sane defined behavior on signed integer overflow ;-)

(Or, how to better organise a discreet relationship with the Director of the CIA.) from https://github.com/agl/pond (the source) is a good elevator pitch, for people (like me) who are taking their time getting what this is. also, is code like this https://github.com/agl/pond/blob/master/server/server.go#L15... just extreme defensive programming? or is there some other reason for the check (eg is not everything locked)? also, does 2. A GPA can learn when messages are sent to a non-home server and which server that is. get weaker if there are many users? and why is it so quiet here? am i asking dumb questions? i've been deleting the ones i work out answers to!

Pond would be the thing to use if it were ready. https://github.com/agl/pond