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Aishou
wayland-keylogger
C2019–2025
Aishou / wayland-keylogger

wayland-keylogger

Proof-of-concept Wayland keylogger

7Distinct people
8Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
187GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Proof-of-concept Wayland keylogger

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 5:04:57 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year8 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2019-04-23 18:21:29 UTC to 2025-11-02 17:42:41 UTC.

0122019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20192020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20222023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2025

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

8 sources
X11 had the distinction between trusted and untrusted X11 clients basically forever. But nobody bothered to even spend the minimal amount of work to make this usable in practice^1. This had two reasons: 1.) It is irrelevant when you run the programs as the same user so nobody bothered (and no: Wayland does not help: https://github.com/Aishou/wayland-keylogger) 2.) It is more fun to simply pretend it is unfixable broken and write something new (something any good engineering manager should have stopped immediately). ¹. I used to use this and also fixed some bugs in some programs. The main problem when I last checked a decade ag was that some important extensions such as composite would need to be exposed to untrusted clients.
In X.org Security Advisory: multiple security issues X.Org X server and Xwayland
What is the point of wayland-keylogger[1] that is linked in the article? Do Wayland compositors normally run under a different user account than the one that logged in via the login manager? I see this as being an issue with full filesystem (or just home) access given to applications, but I don't see how LD_PRELOAD is the problem here. Yet the author of TFA seems to suggest that this is the issue. [1]: https://github.com/Aishou/wayland-keylogger
In Linux (In)Security
The problem is that there are like 4 or 5 efforts going on in Linux right now to make things more secure. But they're all kind of targeted, and we need all of them to coordinate with each other, so individually each of them gets dismissed because "what's the point of plugging one hole?" People mention $HOME access. This is something that we're trying to solve with Flatpack: filesystem access should be sandboxed by default. But that requires coordination with desktop environments like Gnome, otherwise everyone just grants programs anything they want because the UX is bad. And then on top of that we have X11, which is its own mess, and we're trying to address that with Wayland. But Wayland isn't perfect yet for desktop recording, and there's not a ton of effort from software like Emacs to get off of X and onto Wayland because of "what's the
Read the rest
point?" arguments. So Flatpack becomes a lot less valuable because X11 keylogging is so easy. Then we have just flat-out bad user security, where people are setting up sudo without a password. So process isolation becomes a lot less valuable because programs can just manipulate the raw filesystem. And then we have Spectre/Meltdown leaking passwords, but who cares because "people don't set passwords anyway."? And whenever a group of people get together and propose any fixes in isolation, there is inevitably someone in the Linux community who will stand up and say, "Look, Wayland is pointless because someone wrote a keylogger[0]. Why are we spending any time fixing this stuff?" Imagine you are on a boat with 10 holes in the bottom, all of them leaking water. If you want to fix that problem, there is inevitably going to be a period where 5 of the holes are patched and 5 of them aren't. And if you get to that point and start re-opening the holes that did get patched, it's going to be very hard to make any more progress. [0]: https://github.com/Aishou/wayland-keylogger
In Make Linux Fast Again (2019)

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