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AMDESE
AMDSEV
Shell2018–2026
AMDESE / AMDSEV

AMDSEV

AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization

Security & PrivacySystems & Infrastructure
Explore on GitHubRead Hacker News discussions
3Distinct people
5Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
381GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:03:16 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year5 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2018-12-07 03:09:51 UTC to 2026-06-21 03:36:28 UTC.

0122018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20182019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20222023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

5 sources
RandyOrion·Jun 21, 2026
We paid for your things, AMD. If you want to strip some features from things we bought after the purchasing, you must ask me and every other customers for consents explicitly, with a reasonable explanation, and before the strip happens. If one of us show no consent, you cannot do that. ------------- See the github issue [1]. @benkilpatrick found out the problem in April. There was absolutely no consent asking information transparency at all. There was inefficient to no information even for people willing to spend THEIR OWN TIME to solve the problem. After about two months of back and forth with motherboard manufacturer, @benkilpatrick found out the problem stems from some components inside the bios, and the components came from AMD. Another ~three weeks passed and no problem resolution at all. It was after things blow up AMD PR came out a
Read the rest
nd said something about "valuable feedback". Wait, what if there's no enough pushback? What if this github issue as well as the problem it raised is ignored by all? Just see this thread, that thread [2] and whatnot. Is your customers going to screw themselves and being stripped silently for being your customers and believing that new bios will solve their problems without causing shenanigans? ------------- I won't upgrade bios without future third-party bios integrity checks showing the problem is solved properly. [1] https://github.com/AMDESE/AMDSEV/issues/292 [2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48582320
In AMD will reinstate memory encryption on Ryzen 9000 CPUs via BIOS update in July
RandyOrion·Jun 18, 2026
The github issue that never made it in this news: https://github.com/AMDESE/AMDSEV/issues/292 Silent enshittification in the name of updates is getting out of hand. There are several evidences that downgrading BIOS/AGESA to below 1.2.7.0 to 1.2.0.3 brought back TSME for their AMD cpus. I downgrade my bios as a price for my blind trust on AMD, and yes TSME is back. You lost my trust AMD. The lesson learned is that if your PC with AMD cpu is stable, don't do any bios upgrade, as AGESA in the bios is adversarial to you, the users of AMD cpu.
In AMD silently removes memory encryption from consumer Ryzen CPUs
cookiengineer·Nov 12, 2023
Okay, if we are narrowing the topic now to AMD's SME/SEV and Intel's TME/TDX, I'll bite, too. First: Only Ryzen PRO or EPYC models support it, which kind of kicks out all mobile or laptop systems already. Then, only Zen3 CPUs work, because previous generations have a boot freeze bug, which wasn't fixed and upstream linux 5.15 as a result disabled the mem encrypt flag by default. Second: Before you switch topic to SEV, that's only supported for EPYC models, see here [2] Regarding attacks: At least AMD had an injection attack problem where SEV in EPYC 7xxx and 3xxx processors was confirmed to be affected without AMD confirming the vulnerability (yet...). It was a master thesis iirc from a guy in luebeck. There are also known sidechannel attacks which void RAM encryption in practice, like Hertzbleed which used frequency scaling to decrypt EC
Read the rest
DSA and PIKE SIDH (which is meanwhile known to be unsecure, at least for PIKE). [3] Google also did an audit on Intel's TDX where they found bugs in loop boundaries, off by one errors and similar feasible attack methods (which haven't been published as a PoC yet, so I grant you that). [4] So I would still argue that with these very narrow set of available processors (Intel Pro 13th generation for TME and EPYC 7xxx that have both SME and SEV) is highly limited in its availability and also not available for laptop hardware due to them being server CPUs. Additionally there's been a lot of attack surfaces that have been proven to have access to SME or SEV stored keys in the CPU and there have been other sidechannel attacks which conceptionally are very unlikely to be fixed anytime soon. So I would still argue that memory encryption in practice is unreliable. [1] https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/amd-gfx/2021-October/... [2] https://github.com/AMDESE/AMDSEV/issues/1 [3] https://www.hertzbleed.com/ [4] https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/intel_tdx_-_full_r... Edit: found the AMD injection attack thesis: [01] https://www.its.uni-luebeck.de/fileadmin/files/theses/MA_Luc... Another attack on SEV, which was confirmed by others since the USENIX conference. Both of the techniques rely heavily on pattern matching to find the decryption oracles though, and around 16 bytes for their OpenSSH demonstrations. [02] https://www.its.uni-luebeck.de/fileadmin/files/theses/MA_Luc... I'm gonna ignore the game consoles statement because that's a specialized set of CPUs which will never land in any laptop anytime soon. Most of them are AMD, so I'd refer to the same articles anyways.
In Moving our Encrypted DNS servers to run in RAM
latchkey·Nov 25, 2019
AMD has this: https://github.com/AMDESE/AMDSEV SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running encrypted virtual machine (VMs) under the control of KVM. Encrypted VMs have their pages (code and data) secured such that only the guest itself has access to the unencrypted version. Each encrypted VM is associated with a unique encryption key; if its data is accessed to a different entity using a different key the encrypted guests data will be incorrectly decrypted, leading to unintelligible data.
In Keeping Memory Contents Secret

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