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angea
pocorgtfo
TeX2019–2026
angea / pocorgtfo

pocorgtfo

a "Proof of Concept or GTFO" mirror with an extensive index with also whole issues or individual articles as clean PDFs.

14Distinct people
14Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1.6KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

a "Proof of Concept or GTFO" mirror with an extensive index with also whole issues or individual articles as clean PDFs.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 8:59:02 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year14 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2019-07-16 20:42:44 UTC to 2026-02-19 15:01:01 UTC.

012342019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments20192020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20222023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

3 sources
1) People systematically underestimate the possibility of creating collisions that still do something "interesting", like being polyglots (files that can be interpreted in multiple formats, executable or otherwise). See PoC||GTFO, specifically anything by Ange Albertini, for examples; grep https://github.com/angea/pocorgtfo/blob/master/README.md for "MD5". I specifically recommend this writeup: https://github.com/angea/pocorgtfo/blob/master/writeups/19/R... . 1bis) You can use an existing collision to create new collisions. People seem to think you need to generate all the work again from scratch; this is not true. See PoC||GTFO for proof by example. 1cis) The files do not need to be gigantic. See PoC||GTFO for proof by example. 2) You can do the collision in advance, and publish the malicious version later. What it accomplishes is that t
Read the rest
he concept of "this Git hash unambiguously specifies a revision" no longer works, and one of them can be malicious. 3) The standard should be "obviously safe beyond a reasonable doubt", not "not obviously unsafe to a non-expert". By the latter standard, pretty much any random encryption construction is fine. (The examples I gave use MD5, not SHA-1, but that's a matter of degrees.) 4) SHA-256 was published years before git first was.
In SHA-1 'fully and practically broken' by new collision (2020)

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