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anthropics
sandbox-runtime
TypeScript2025–2026
anthropics / sandbox-runtime

sandbox-runtime

A lightweight sandboxing tool for enforcing filesystem and network restrictions on arbitrary processes at the OS level, without requiring a container.

24Distinct people
28Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
7.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

A lightweight sandboxing tool for enforcing filesystem and network restrictions on arbitrary processes at the OS level, without requiring a container.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:56:07 PM UTC.

Claude Code's "Don't Ask Again" exposes passwords in 1,122 public GitHub files direct repository linkDebated

The discussion centers on whether Claude Code's 'Don't Ask Again' feature is at fault for leaking secrets into public repositories or if the issue stems entirely from user negligence in committing local settings files. Conversely, defenders argue that manual review is fundamentally unsustainable at scale and that the industry must shift toward automated approval or robust sandboxing despite current flaws.

429 readable replies · Supporting reply 1 · Supporting reply 2 · Supporting reply 3 · Supporting reply 4

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month28 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2025-10-20 18:51:20 UTC to 2026-10-22 19:05:00 UTC.

02468102025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 commentsOct 20252025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 9 mentions; 1 submissions, 8 comments2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 commentsApr 20262026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 commentsOct 2026

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Oct 20252025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC514
Nov 20252025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Dec 20252025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20262026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC918
Feb 20262026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Mar 20262026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Apr 20262026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC211
May 20262026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20262026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20262026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Aug 20262026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC303
Sep 20262026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20262026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

28 sources
In this vein, Anthropic's sandbox-runtime [0] has struck a good balance between security and convenience. Simple config, filesystem and network restrictions, and credential masking make me comfortable running Pi in YOLO mode. Though I'm often running into frustrating (albeit intentional) sandbox restrictions with common workflows e.g. xcode/swift and Docker access. Would love suggestions for how to give agents access to those kinds of tooling inside the sandbox, either with srt or an alternative (with similar convenience characteristics). [0] https://github.com/anthropics/sandbox-runtime
In OpenShell – A safe, private runtime for fleets of autonomous AI agents
Claude Code is definitely a harness. The term harness is pretty loosely defined, but it effectively means the software that wraps an LLM, asks the LLM what tools it should execute, then executes those tools. I wouldn't classify Claude Code as a sandbox, though it does have some sandbox features built in, using https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime (which I would classify as a sandbox)
In Claude Code is leaking real email address as a User-Agent string in curl command
For small projects where I don't wish to interact with Claude so much, I've started using Anthropic's sandbox runtime utility "srt": https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime This is combined with "auto" mode. Seems to work so far. I've manually checked various things, rw access, access to sensitive folders/files etc. So far, I've only used it on two small projects. My major projects I've been clicking through prompts and recently switched to "auto" mode. I'm not quite sure why anyone would trust "--dangerously-skip-permissions". I've seen these agents go off-piste far too many times, installing unnecessary packages, environments, calling sudo & creating files in all sorts of places. There's a page on various sandboxing strategies on their site: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sandbox-environments I've seen various comment
Read the rest
s in several topics with folk baking their own sandboxes. That's great. Although I'd be inclined to try Anthropic's solutions initially.
In Auto mode is now the default in Claude Code
I've been satisfied with using Pi inside of srt [0]. I launch with `srt pi` and get file system and network isolation. There is a seemingly infinite risk surface area to protect, but I think does a reasonable job of balancing security and convenience. I've also heard good things about nono [1] from colleagues, but I haven't personally tried it out yet. [0] https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime [1] https://github.com/nolabs-ai/nono
In Pi's Minimalism Is Its Advantage
I build a lot of my own tools, to suit exactly how I want to work. Obviously, having a little thinky guy in the computer to do most of the busy work of making new tools accelerates that, but tools that make the LLMs suit me also accelerates my general work. Some stuff I've built: https://github.com/swelljoe/tandem - Tandem is a sysadmin buddy that travels with you over ssh. Just a wrapper over tmux and claude code (or whatever agent you like), it opens two panes in tmux, one with an ssh session to one of the hundreds of devices I maintain, and one with a local Claude Code configured to use a local work space and instructed via CLAUDE.md/AGENTS.md to use tmux to interact with the remote machine. I built it because a lot of my coworkers were installing Claude Code on our robots and authenticating there to get help with robot troubles, and t
Read the rest
hat felt bad. This allows them to keep all sensitive stuff locally and still get help troubleshooting directly on the device. I happen to find it useful, sometimes, too. https://github.com/swelljoe/nelson - Nelson is a fancy Ralph loop for security bug hunting that I built to help audit my own software. It's also grown to include a benchmark suite I'm using to figure out which models are worth using for security work. I've published some of those benchmark results, and have a few hundred hours/dollars worth of new ones to publish this weekend. Turns out the benchmarking is more interesting, so that's gotten more attention than the bug-hunting side, but the benchmarks inform how the bug-hunting side works, and I added multi-model/multi-pass scans and de-dupe features recently because I found that letting models have a couple bites at the apple increases discovery, and there are bugs that only some models catch, and it's not always the top model that finds them. There's some overlap, but also some divergence. This research has also led me to start working on a harness for security auditing tasks; giving the agent tools and project structure data to lift detection and reduce false positives. https://github.com/swelljoe/flar - FLAR is the Fast Light Agent Restrictor. It bubblewraps an agent so it is quite safe to use agents on your local machine, even with `--dangerously-skip-permissions` (which makes agents more fun to use). The sandbox feature found in most agents is porous and can be expanded by the agent harness itself. Similarly, if the agent introduces a supply chain attack into your code and runs it before you get a chance to audit/review it in a PR or run it through an SBOM dependency checker, the blast radius is exactly the project directory and the credentials/history of the one agent. (Whereas, without flar, the blast radius is your whole .ssh, github creds, all agent creds, your keyring, whatever secrets are in your home, etc.) This one is new. Just made it because I was talking about how I always put agents in VMs because I don't trust them. Someone suggested `srt` (https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime) and I like the idea but I don't like how complicated and huge and JavaScript it is. You can read and understand the entirety of `flar` in one sitting. Anyway, to break out of "prompt/response", you have to skip permissions, or call it via `claude -p` or API with tasks to perform. Nelson does the latter and `flar` does the former. That's not to mention all the side projects and other stuff I've been able to make a lot of progress on. The biggest one is finishing https://venturous.app/ (or, at least I made it do what I most wanted it to do, which is provide map overlays of US public lands and mobile data provider coverage so I can find cool places to camp free while staying connected). This is a re-implementation of an old defunct app called FreeRoam that I absolutely loved when I traveled full-time. I built half of it over several months by hand, and then Claude helped finish it in a few weekends and holidays. I'll get Claude to help build the mobile apps someday.
In Ask HN: Is anyone experimenting with different ways of using LLMs for coding?
FYI the sandbox feature is not fully baked and does not seem to be high priority. For example, for the last 3 weeks using the sandbox on Linux will almost-always litter your repo root with a bunch of write-protected trash files[0] - there are 2 PRs open to fix it, but Anthropic employees have so far entirely ignored both the issue and the PRs. Very frustrating, since models sometimes accidentally commit those files, so you have to add a bunch of junk to your gitignore. And with claude code being closed source and distributed as a bun standalone executable it's difficult to patch the bug yourself. [0]: https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime/is...
In Claude Code daily benchmarks for degradation tracking
There has been a lot of examples of how to sandbox Claude Code and other agentic tools on HN lately. I decided to look into the options and realized Claude Caude already has a sandbox feature that I never saw mentioned among the suggestions. It uses bubblewrap/sandbox-exec[0] and is baked into Claude Code itself. Does anyone have experience with it compared to more DIY options? The obvious downside I can see is I need to put all my trust in Claude Code as compared to running it completely inside some environment.. [0] https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime
In Sandboxing – Claude Code Docs

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