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anthropics
sandbox-runtime
TypeScript2025–2026
anthropics / sandbox-runtime

sandbox-runtime

A lightweight sandboxing tool for enforcing filesystem and network restrictions on arbitrary processes at the OS level, without requiring a container.

24Distinct people
28Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
7.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

A lightweight sandboxing tool for enforcing filesystem and network restrictions on arbitrary processes at the OS level, without requiring a container.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 5:05:26 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month28 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2025-10-20 18:51:20 UTC to 2026-10-22 19:05:00 UTC.

02468102025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 commentsOct 20252025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 9 mentions; 1 submissions, 8 comments2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 commentsApr 20262026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 commentsOct 2026

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Oct 20252025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC514
Nov 20252025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Dec 20252025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20262026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC918
Feb 20262026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Mar 20262026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Apr 20262026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC211
May 20262026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20262026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20262026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Aug 20262026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC303
Sep 20262026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20262026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

2 sources
might be good to get your hands around this early. reading up on how crush, goose, and opencode handle this may be a good idea. i've been trying to build a web native terminal assistant for a while (just a side project) and this is easily the thing that keeps me up at night. ### Primary Sources: - *Anthropic Engineering Blog: "Making Claude Code more secure and autonomous with sandboxing"* Detailed article on Claude Code's sandboxing features, including OS-level primitives (e.g., Linux Bubblewrap, macOS Seatbelt) for filesystem and network isolation. [Read here](https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/claude-code-sandboxing) (Published Oct 20, 2025). - *Claude Code Documentation: Sandboxing* Official docs covering setup, configuration, security benefits (e.g., prompt injection protection), and limitations of filesystem/network i
Read the rest
solation in Claude Code. [Read here](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sandboxing). - *Claude Blog: "Beyond permission prompts: making Claude Code more secure and autonomous"* Overview of sandboxing in Claude Code, emphasizing boundaries for safer agent execution. [Read here](https://claude.com/blog/beyond-permission-prompts-making-cla...) (Published Oct 31, 2025). ### Additional Resources: For broader context on sandboxing agentic AI: - *arXiv Paper: "Securing AI Agent Execution"* Research on isolation techniques for AI agents, including risk assessment. [Read here](https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.21236) (Published Oct 24, 2025). - *HopX Documentation* Practical guide to sandboxing for AI agents (e.g., using Firecracker micro-VMs). [Read here](https://hopx.ai/) (Open-source SDK available at [GitHub](https://github.com/hopx-ai/sdk)). ### Cursor Cursor uses local-first editing with optional sandboxing via Docker containers for isolated execution (no default vendor-owned sandboxes). It respects user-defined rules without overriding them. - *Skywork AI Blog: Security in Cursor 2.0* Details Cursor's sandboxing for code execution, network protection, and isolation. [Read here](https://skywork.ai/blog/vibecoding/cursor-2-0-security-priva...) (Published Nov 1, 2025). - *Skywork AI Blog: Cursor 2.0 vs Claude Code SDK* Compares isolation techniques, noting Cursor's local sandboxes vs. Claude's cloud-based ones. [Read here](https://skywork.ai/blog/vibecoding/cursor-2-0-vs-claude-code...) (Published Nov 1, 2025). ### OpenAI Codex Codex primarily relies on API-based execution with optional user-managed sandboxes (e.g., via Firecracker or custom proxies). It emphasizes provider retention policies but lacks built-in native sandboxing like Claude Code. - *Render Blog: Testing AI Coding Agents (2025)* Benchmarks Codex's handling of isolation in production tasks, including Docker-based sandboxes. [Read here](https://render.com/blog/ai-coding-agents-benchmark) (Published Aug 12, 2025). - *Medium: Claude Code vs Cursor* Indirect comparison noting Codex's API retention and sandbox limitations vs. Cursor/Claude. [Read here](https://open-data-analytics.medium.com/claude-code-vs-cursor...) (Published Aug 6, 2025). ### Goose AI (Codename Goose) Goose uses container-based isolation via tools like Container Use (built on Dagger) for git-branch-isolated environments, emphasizing safe experimentation without affecting the host. - *Goose Blog: Isolated Dev Environments* Explains Goose's container-use for sandboxes, including lifecycle management and rollback. [Read here](https://block.github.io/goose/blog/2025/06/19/isolated-devel...) (Published Jun 19, 2025). - *GitHub Discussion: Goose vs Claude Code* Community analysis comparing Goose's local isolation to Claude Code's cloud sandboxes. [Read here](https://github.com/block/goose/discussions/3133) (Ongoing, started Jun 27, 2025). - *Slashdot: Compare Claude vs. Goose* High-level comparison including deployment isolation. [Read here](https://slashdot.org/software/comparison/Claude-vs-codename-...). also: check out the open-source sandbox runtime from Anthropic: [GitHub Repo](https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime). clearly i have a bias on this topic, lol
In Show HN: Vibe coded an AI chat app with features I wanted, Poe

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