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security-pcc
Swift2024–2026
apple / security-pcc

security-pcc

Private Cloud Compute (PCC)

8Distinct people
8Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1.3KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Private Cloud Compute (PCC)

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 1:49:46 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month8 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2024-10-24 18:18:23 UTC to 2026-06-09 17:55:43 UTC.

01232024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 2 submissions, 1 commentsOct 20242024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsAug 20252025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsJun 2026

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Oct 20242024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC321
Nov 20242024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20242024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Feb 20252025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Mar 20252025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Apr 20252025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20252025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20252025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20252025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20252025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20252025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20252025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20252025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20252025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20262026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20262026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20262026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20262026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20262026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20262026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

8 sources
you have to trust Apple that the server side is running all that stuff Remote attestation should be proving to the client that the server is running the expected firmware and PCC software hashes, https://security.apple.com/documentation/private-cloud-compu.... Apple has released (some? all?) source for PCC software on the server, https://github.com/apple/security-pcc > When a user’s device sends an inference request to Private Cloud Compute, the request is sent end-to-end encrypted to the specific PCC nodes needed for the request. The PCC nodes share a public key and an attestation — cryptographic proof of key ownership and measurements of the software running on the PCC node — with the user’s device, and the user’s device compares these measurements against a public, append-only ledger of PCC software releases. > compelled by a governme
Read the rest
nt Sadly, the bar is much lower than "compel". Devices are routinely compromised by zero-day vulnerabilities sold by exploit brokers to multiple parties on the open market, including governments. Especially any device with cellular, wifi or bluetooth radios. Hopefully the Apple C1 modem starts a new trend in radio baseband hardening, including PAC, ASLR and iBoot, https://www.reuters.com/technology/apple-reveals-first-custo...
In Apple says it will add 20k jobs, spend $500B, produce AI servers in US
> Apple even says it will publish its software images (though unfortunately not the source code) so that security researchers can check them over for bugs. I think Apple recently changed their stance on this. Now, they say that "source code for certain security-critical PCC components are available under a limited-use license." Of course, would have loved it if the whole thing was open source. ;) https://github.com/apple/security-pcc/ > The goal of this system is to make it hard for both attackers and Apple employees to exfiltrate data from these devices. I think Apple is claiming more than that. They are saying 1/ they don't keep any user data (data only gets processed during inference), 2/ no privileged runtime access, so their support engineers can't see user data, and 3/ they make binaries and parts of the source code available to sec
Read the rest
urity researchers to validate 1/ and 2/. You can find Apple PCC's five requirements here: https://security.apple.com/documentation/private-cloud-compu... Note: Not affiliated with Apple. We read through the PCC security guide to see what an equivalent solution would look like in open source. If anyone is interested in this topic, please hit me up at ozgun @ ubicloud . com.
In Let's talk about AI and end-to-end encryption

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