trivy

Last month it was trivy: https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/security/advisories/GH...

Attackers trying to stifle discussion, they did the same for trivy: https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/discussions/10420

It needs internet access for upgrading the check bundle and for full Java library resolution (pom.xml). See e.g. https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/discussions/9698

> On March 22, 2026, a threat actor used compromised credentials to publish a malicious Trivy v0.69.5 and v0.69.6 DockerHub images. (https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/security/advisories/GH...) So the first incident was on March 19th and the second incident is March 22nd —- evidently the attackers maintained persistence through maybe two separate credential rotation efforts.

Someone else with same issue https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/discussions/10425#disc...

It seems not enough again, as their Docker images have now been compromised (as of March 22nd, 2026): https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/security/advisories/GH...

Ah, I think the HN post was merged. My original comment was in response to this related github discussion: https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/discussions/10420 There are hundreds of automated spam comments there from presumably compromised accounts. The new OP is much more clear regarding what has happened.

Trivy (a very widely-used security scanner) was recently compromised. Anyone who installed the aquasecurity/trivy-action dependency by tag rather than by sha during a 3 hour period on March 19 was likely compromised. There is a Github security advisory at https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/security/advisories/GH... 6 separate people have tried to submit this to HN. All of the submissions are marked as [dead]. I am unsure whether this is a malicious action taken by the actors who compromised trivy or whether it's just the result of prior spam under github.com/aquasecurity, but regardless it is probably not ideal for security advisories to be auto-marked as [dead].

More details here: https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/trivy-compromised-a-second-... Current GitHub discussion (the old discussion was removed by the attacker): https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/discussions/10420

The offending commit seems to be: https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/commit/1885610c6a34811... which updates the action to `actions/checkout@70379aad1a8b40919ce8b382d3cd7d0315cde1d0 # v6.0.2`. https://github.com/actions/checkout/commit/70379aad1a8b40919... is not actually in `actions/checkout` but a fork, and it pulls malicious code from the typo-squatted "scan.aquasecurtiy.org" (note the _tiy_). Any system with Trivy 0.69.4 on it (and being run) can be assumed to be compromised.

In colloquial English my construction is just fine, but sure, you'd be welcome to pick longer too. Some examples of my usage in the wild ("response times may be slower" is present verbatim on each page): https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/discussions/8133 https://www.ameristarstaffingny.com/the-negative-effects-of-... https://oci.wi.gov/Pages/Regulation/Bulletin20200320Regulato... https://playrix.helpshift.com/hc/en/27-questbound/faq/13930-...

That particular structure hasn't really taken off, but the general idea of having unique-ish token formats that can be mapped back to a provider is becoming more popular. Trivy has a pretty good collection of examples that is used for its secret scanning functionality, https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/blob/main/pkg/fanal/se....

Besides pointing pentester tools like metasploit at yourself, there are some nice scanners out there. Examples in no particular order: https://github.com/quay/clair https://github.com/anchore/grype/ https://github.com/eliasgranderubio/dagda/ https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy So then you set up something like a cron job to scan everything for you and email the results once a week or whatever if you don't want to monitor things actively.