AppleNeuralHash2ONNX

m looked for content... and Apple was going to feed it a CSAM "database" to find that type of content. The problem is that Apple has to follow local rules and many governments have their own database of bad content to block (and report to the authorities)... and Apple usually complies instead of leaving the market. For example, in China, the state has access to encrypted data because Apple gave them the encryption keys per local law. They also ban censorship avoidance apps. For some reason this would be different? If you want to insist that it was just for CSAM and that people criticising Apple are pedos or are against companies combating CSAM, then do it, but do it with the knowledge that the system wasn't just for CSAM, that it could be tricked (and possibly ruin people's lives), and that it would likely been abused by governments.

as possible while still keeping it colliding. The bad looking examples that people initially posted just did nothing to try to make the result look good. I'm thrilled to see that someone other than me has now also worked out getting fairly reasonable looking examples.

ng the model to show how flawed it is... Apple's only 'security' feature here was obscurity... It's so broken the person doing analysis above stopped as Apple will only change the hash function to include his pictures as training data instead of fixing the whole system. Are you still convinced? Having a second 'perceptual' hash doesn't really add much value... I'm not an expert, here's a better view on why: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28243031 Also funniest bit from that on how broken it is "Finding a SHA1 collision took 22 years, and there are still no effective preimage attacks against it. Creating the NeuralHash collider took a single week."

proposal to scan user's data which were made prior to the hash function being available. I'm doubtful they'll meaningfully fix the hash function-- this entire approach is flawed-- but even if they do, it hardly improves the ethics of the system at all. In my view the gross vulnerability of the hash function is mostly relevant because it speaks to a pattern of incompetence and a failure to adequately consider attacks and their consequences. - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28111959 Your device scanning and reporting you violates its ethical duty as your trusted agent. - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28111908 Apple's human review exists for the express purpose of quashing your fourth amendment right against warrantless search. - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28121695 Apple is not being coerced to perform these searches and if they were that would make their actions less ethical, not more. - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28097304 Apple uses complex crypto to protect themselves from accountability. - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28124716 A simplified explanation of a private set intersection. - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28101009 Perceptual hashes at best slightly improve resistance to false negatives at the expense of destroying any kind of cryptographic protection against false positives (as this thread has shown!). Smart perverts can evade any perceptual hash, dumb ones won't alter the images. - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28097508 Apple's system and ones like it likely create an incentive to abuse more children And these posts written after: - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28260264 A second "secret" hash function cannot be secret from the state actors that produce the database for Apple. - https://github.com/AsuharietYgvar/AppleNeuralHash2ONNX//issu... fuzzy hashes with resistance against false positives tracable to sha256 are possible, but require you to value privacy over avoiding false negatives. [1] https://github.com/AsuharietYgvar/AppleNeuralHash2ONNX//issu... [2] https://github.com/AsuharietYgvar/AppleNeuralHash2ONNX//issu... [3] "Apple however told Motherboard in an email that that version analyzed by users on GitHub is a generic version, and not the one final version that will be used for iCloud Photos CSAM detection." https://www.vice.com/en/article/wx5yzq/apple-defends-its-ant... [4] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28221538

see it in review, and the NCMEC guidance tells people when in doubt to report. Besides, once someone else has looked at your pictures your privacy has been violated.