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Atoptool
atop
C2025–2025
Atoptool / atop

atop

System and process monitor for Linux

8Distinct people
11Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

System and process monitor for Linux

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 10:49:33 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by week11 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2025-03-26 00:05:29 UTC to 2025-07-30 12:44:50 UTC. Weeks start Monday, UTC.

02468102025-03-24 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-03-31 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 9 mentions; 0 submissions, 9 commentsMar 242025-03-31 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-07 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-04-07 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-14 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-04-14 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-21 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-04-21 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-28 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-04-28 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-05-05 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-05-05 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-05-12 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-05-12 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-05-19 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-05-19 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-05-26 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-05-26 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-06-02 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsMay 262025-06-02 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-06-09 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-06-09 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-06-16 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-06-16 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-06-23 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-06-23 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-06-30 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-06-30 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-07-07 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-07-07 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-07-14 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-07-14 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-07-21 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-07-21 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-07-28 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-07-28 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-08-04 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 commentsJul 28

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Mar 242025-03-24 00:00:00 UTC2025-03-31 00:00:00 UTC909
Mar 312025-03-31 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-07 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 72025-04-07 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-14 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 142025-04-14 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-21 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 212025-04-21 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-28 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 282025-04-28 00:00:00 UTC2025-05-05 00:00:00 UTC000
May 52025-05-05 00:00:00 UTC2025-05-12 00:00:00 UTC000
May 122025-05-12 00:00:00 UTC2025-05-19 00:00:00 UTC000
May 192025-05-19 00:00:00 UTC2025-05-26 00:00:00 UTC000
May 262025-05-26 00:00:00 UTC2025-06-02 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 22025-06-02 00:00:00 UTC2025-06-09 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 92025-06-09 00:00:00 UTC2025-06-16 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 162025-06-16 00:00:00 UTC2025-06-23 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 232025-06-23 00:00:00 UTC2025-06-30 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 302025-06-30 00:00:00 UTC2025-07-07 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 72025-07-07 00:00:00 UTC2025-07-14 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 142025-07-14 00:00:00 UTC2025-07-21 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 212025-07-21 00:00:00 UTC2025-07-28 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 282025-07-28 00:00:00 UTC2025-08-04 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

2 sources
A bug matching the details of the vaguepost was found by a third party with no help from Rachel: https://blog.bismuth.sh/blog/bismuth-found-the-atop-bug > Given the vagueness, we were curious if Bismuth's bug scanning capabilities could find the bug so we let it rip on the code base. 10 minutes later, we had it. Or at least we had a bug which looked and behaved exactly like Rachel described. > As soon as we figured this out and had something reproducible we moved to responsibly disclose the issue and we emailed Gerlof at 8pm on the 26th. > Seeing this bug and how it's triggered, I understand Rachel's initial reaction to write a vague "get rid of it" post without going into detail. [...] That said, the internet loves to run wild with speculation and there's a reason we have the responsible disclosure process. For something that's installed
Read the rest
as often as Nvidia GPU drivers, it would be prudent to spend the extra few days and have a controlled disclosure. Posting something like that can start off an arms race to find the bug, and if someone malicious were to reproduce and exploit it first, they get free reign to take over affected systems until it's patched. Yes, sounding the alarm might cause people to uninstall it, but there's plenty of places where it will remain, giving malicious actors incentive to go for it. But with a coordinated disclosure, the arms race never starts, and systems are patched before anyone realizes there was an issue. The atop maintainer fixed the bug on March 29th, and also changed the behaviour of atop to _not_ connect to its helper daemons by default: https://github.com/Atoptool/atop/commit/542b7f7ac52926ca2721... ... and released it as atop v2.11.1 on April 5th: https://github.com/Atoptool/atop/releases/tag/v2.11.1 There has been nothing on Rachel's blog about this topic since the vaguepost and vaguepost followup. The CVE (https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-31160) is still incorrect, and there's no indication who requested it. It says that versions "0 - 2.11.0" are affected, this is untrue, because the atopgpud (and support in atop for reading from it) was introduced in version 2.4.0 ("The vulnerability is present since the introduction of 'atopgpud' in atop 2.4.0." per https://www.atoptool.nl/downloadatop.php)
In Project Zero – Policy and Disclosure: 2025 Edition
I stand by what I said at the time: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43492940 - and if you only read one thing, read the harrassment an atop contributor was subjected to by "eslerm": https://github.com/Atoptool/atop/issues/330#issuecomment-275... I bring it up because of the unmissable parallels. Google are trialling a policy to see what will happen, but this incident shows already what can happen. RbtB is a trusted blog by the HN crowd, and her vaguepost unexpectedly whipped up hysteria. It was only quelled by a post with more details the next day. Google Project Zero has enormous levels of trust, intends to vaguepost as policy, and not post more details the next day to satisfy the mob. It does not look good for volunteer maintainers to suffer an entire world of talentless clowns rifling through every commit and asking "is this the b
Read the rest
ug Project Zero found?"
In Project Zero – Policy and Disclosure: 2025 Edition

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