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bitcoin-core
gitian.sigs
Python2016–2021
bitcoin-core / gitian.sigs · Archived

gitian.sigs

Bitcoin Core release signatures (gitian)

2Distinct people
2Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
170GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Bitcoin Core release signatures (gitian)

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 1:49:46 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year2 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-08-18 00:16:42 UTC to 2021-05-03 05:29:40 UTC.

012016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20162017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20182019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2021

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

2 sources
First, the releases are signed-- just not with the windows code signing infrastructure. For windows the CA improperly revoked the certificate in response to a renewal request and back dated the revocation and are refusing to issue a new certificate (my understanding and that the CA now believes open source collaborations aren't eligible for code signing certs, or some such nonsense... it's being worked out) The releases are still PGP signed by an official project key which has been in use for many years and is cross signed by many parties-- just as they have the last decade--, as well as by another 16 parties that independent reproduced the binaries through the deterministic build process: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/gitian.sigs/tree/master/0.21... which has also been used for the last ten years. Anyone who already has an older faith
Read the rest
ful copy has the scripts to automatically download and verify the other signatures. By comparison, the windows code signing provides relatively little security assurance. Not too dissimilar from the HTTPS used on the download site. It, like the https, does have the advantage that it is widely checked while many users don't bother checking the actual release signatures. It's useful to have for sure, but it's not the only protection and, unfortunately, it exist only at the whim of a third party that isn't accountable to the users of Bitcoin. But if someone can spoof the download site the executable signing won't do much to stop them from causing problems.
In Bitcoin Core: Bitcoin Core 0.21.1 released with Taproot activation code
So far, none of the others I have pinged about this has any info as to its veracity or background. Unlike most contributions to bitcoin.org, this one was pushed to the master branch without a corresponding pull request (a mechanism used to solicit review and feedback from others). https://github.com/bitcoin-dot-org/bitcoin.org/commit/5e0fd5... I suggest skepticism. We should be cautious of anyone skipping peer review processes, even for security incidents. Poor handling of these situations can lead to unintentional panic where panic of any kind is unhelpful to resolving issues. However, everyone should always be encouraged to check the signatures regardless of alerts, of course. Multiple signatures should always be checked, and not just Wladimir's signature. Use the gitian signatures repository to get other signatures, and always verify p
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ublic key and signature data through multiple independent channels. gitian signatures repository: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/gitian.sigs GPG build verification steps: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/release-p... gitian build steps: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/gitian-bu... gnupg CVE-2016-6316 from today https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2016q3/0003... Also, don't use gpg short ids. Always verify fingerprints. There are gpg short id matching keys floating around for some Bitcoin developers - for example, http://pgp.surfnet.nl:11371/pks/lookup?op=vindex&fingerprint... check out the revoked key. ( This reply is x-posted from https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/4y8m76/0130_binary... )
In Bitcoin 0.13.0 Binary Safety Warning

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