Something like the `bitcoin:` URI scheme?
bitcoin:1fs8e...?amount=0.01
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0021.mediawi...
In Marriott hack hits 500M Starwood guestsbitcoin
bips
Wikitext2013–2026
bitcoin / bips
bips
Bitcoin Improvement Proposals
104Distinct people
124Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
11KGitHub stars
What to know before exploring
What it is
Bitcoin Improvement Proposals
GitHub
Where it is used
- Ledger Wallet (Ledger Live) — Ledger Wallet uses the BIP32, BIP39 and BIP44 standards to manage seeds and derivation paths for generating keys and addresses. Source
What people are saying
No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.
No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.
Also in these discussions
- bcoin-org/bcoin · linked in 2 of the same discussions
Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.
This week on Hacker News
Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 3:30:57 AM UTC.
No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.
Mentions over time
HN mentions by year124 dated mentions
Observed mentions: 2013-12-10 19:15:46 UTC to 2026-09-13 15:23:25 UTC.
* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.
Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.
View mention counts and date ranges
| Period | Start (UTC) | End (exclusive, UTC) | Mentions | Submissions | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | 2013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| 2014 | 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 10 | 1 | 9 |
| 2015 | 2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 8 | 0 | 8 |
| 2016 | 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 9 | 0 | 9 |
| 2017 | 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 12 | 1 | 11 |
| 2018 | 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 10 | 1 | 9 |
| 2019 | 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 7 | 0 | 7 |
| 2020 | 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 15 | 0 | 15 |
| 2021 | 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 17 | 0 | 17 |
| 2022 | 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 13 | 0 | 13 |
| 2023 | 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 6 | 0 | 6 |
| 2024 | 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 7 | 1 | 6 |
| 2025 | 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| 2026 (partial) | 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 4 | 1 | 3 |
From the project README
An excerpt from the repository, fetched Nov 13, 2026.
Read the project’s introduction
People wishing to submit a BIP should first describe their idea to the bitcoindev@googlegroups.com
mailing list to gather feedback on viability and community interest before working on a
formal description. Please open a pull request to this repository only when substantial progress on the draft has been
made, preferably when the draft is nearing completion. Authors do not assign a number to their own proposal.
After a proposal meets the editorial criteria, a BIP Editor will assign a number to it and publish the proposal by
merging the pull request to the repository. Please see BIP 3: Updated BIP Process for the full process.
The BIPs repository serves as a publication medium and archive. Having a BIP published here indicates that the proposal
is in scope and has met other formal criteria for this repository, but does not indicate that it is a good idea, has
community consensus, or that it is about to be adopted. The BIP Editors are expected to be liberal with publishing BIPs
and to try not to be too involved in decision-making on behalf of the community. Beyond the formal criteria, evaluation of
the proposals is left to the audience of the repository. When a proposal is controversial and it cannot be agreed upon
whether it should be published, the conservative option will always be preferred: the proposal will be closed.
Those proposing and opposing changes should consider that ultimately acceptance and adoption rests with the Bitcoin
users (see also: economic majority).
Number
Layer
Title
Owner
Type
Status
1
BIP Purpose and Guidelines
Amir Taaki
Process
Closed
2
BIP process, revised
Luke Dashjr
Process
Closed
3
Updated BIP Process
Murch
Process
Deployed
8
Version bits with lock-in by height
Shaolin Fry, Luke Dashjr
Informational
Complete
9
Version bits with timeout and delay
Pieter Wuille, Peter Todd, Greg Maxwell, Rusty Russell
Informational
Deployed
10
Applications
Multi-Sig Transaction Distribution
Alan Reiner
Informational
Closed
11
Applications
M-of-N Standard Transactions
Gavin Andresen
Specification
Deployed
12
Consensus (soft fork)
OP_EVAL
Gavin Andresen
Specification
Closed
13
Applications
Address Format for pay-to-script-hash
Gavin Andresen
Specification
Deployed
14
Peer Services
Protocol Version and User Agent
Amir Taaki, Patrick Strateman
Specification
Deployed
15
Applications
Aliases
Amir Taaki
Specification
Closed
16
Consensus (soft fork)
Pay to Script Hash
Gavin Andresen
Specification
Deployed
17
Consensus (soft fork)
OP_CHECKHASHVERIFY (CHV)
Luke Dashjr
Specification
Closed
18
Consensus (soft fork)
hashScriptCheck
Luke Dashjr
Specification
Complete
19
Applications
M-of-N Standard Transactions (Low SigOp)
Luke Dashjr
Specification
Closed
20
Applications
URI Scheme
Luke Dashjr
Specification
Closed
21
Applications
URI Scheme
Nils Schneider, Matt Corallo
Specification
Closed
22
API/RPC
getblocktemplate - Fundamentals
Luke Dashjr
Specification
Deployed
23
API/RPC
getblocktemplate - Pooled Mining
Luke Dashjr
Specification
Deployed
30
Consensus (soft fork)
Duplicate transactions
Pieter Wuille
Specification
Deployed
31
Peer Services
Pong message
Mike Hearn
Specification
Deployed
32
Applications
Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets
Pieter Wuille
Informational
Deployed
33
Peer Services
Stratized Nodes
Amir Taaki
Specification
Closed
34
Consensus (soft fork)
Block v2, Height in Coinbase
Gavin Andresen
Specification
Deployed
35
Peer Services
mempool message
Jeff Garzik
Specification
Deployed
36
Peer Services
Custom Services
Stefan Thomas
Specification
Closed
37
Peer Services
Connection Bloom filtering
Mike Hearn, Matt Corallo
Specification
Deployed
38
Applications
Passphrase-protected private key
Mike Caldwell, Aaron Voisine
Specification
Deployed
39
Applications
Mnemonic code for generating deterministic keys
Marek Palatinus, Pavol Rusnak, Aaron Voisine, Sean Bowe
Specification
Deployed
40
API/RPC
Stratum wire protocol
Marek Palatinus
Standard
BIP number allocated
41
API/RPC
Stratum mining protocol
Marek Palatinus
Standard
BIP number allocated
42
Consensus (soft fork)
A finite monetary supply for Bitcoin
Pieter Wuille
Specification
Deployed
43
Applications
Purpose Field for Deterministic Wallets
Marek Palatinus, Pavol Rusnak
Specification
Deployed
44
Applications
Multi-Account Hierarchy for Deterministic Wallets
Marek Palatinus, Pavol Rusnak
Specification
Deployed
45
Applications
Structure for Deterministic P2SH Multisignature Wallets
Manuel Araoz, Ryan X. Charles, Matias Alejo Garcia
Specification
Complete
46
Applications
Address Scheme for Timelocked Fidelity Bonds
Chris Belcher, Thebora Kompanioni
Specification
Draft
47
Applications
Reusable Payment Codes for Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets
Justus Ranvier
Specification
Deployed
48
Applications
Multi-Script Hierarchy for Multi-Sig Wallets
Fontaine
Specification
Deployed
49
Applications
Derivation scheme for P2WPKH-nested-in-P2SH based accounts
Daniel Weigl
Specification
Deployed
50
March 2013 Chain Fork Post-Mortem
Gavin Andresen
Informational
Deployed
52
Consensus (hard fork)
Durable, Low Energy Bitcoin PoW
Michael Dubrovsky, Bogdan Penkovsky
Specification
Closed
53
Consensus (soft fork)
Disallow 64-byte transactions
Chris Stewart
Specification
Draft
54
Consensus (soft fork)
Consensus Cleanup
Antoine Poinsot, Matt Corallo
Specification
Complete
60
Peer Services
Fixed Length "version" Message (Relay-Transactions Field)
Amir Taaki
Specification
Closed
61
Peer Services
Reject P2P message
Gavin Andresen
Specification
Deployed
62
Consensus (soft fork)
Dealing with malleability
Pieter Wuille
Specification
Closed
63
Applications
Stealth Addresses
Peter Todd
Standard
BIP number allocated
64
Peer Services
getutxo message
Mike Hearn
Specifi
Read the full README on GitHubWhat Hacker News says
10 sourcesFor Bitcoin, BIP 70 was proposed (and quite widely implemented) to take care of a lot of these issues. I assume many other cash-style cryptocurrencies have something similar these days.
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0070.mediawi...
In Marriott hack hits 500M Starwood guestsWhen the new SegWit feature was introduced to Bitcoin, it came with a new address format called Bech32. https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0173.mediawi...
In Base58So if I understand this correctly, it was a hard fork in version 0.15 (by the definition 'accepting a subset of blocks than a previous version'), but nobody exploited it. Similar the BDB/LevelDB incident documented in BIP 0050 (which actually had a chain split).[1]
There was a chain split due to a soft fork in 2010: the "value overflow incident".[0] Controversial since the soft fork was announced after the incident was exploited.
[0]: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Value_overflow_incident
[1]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0050.mediawi...
In Bitcoin Core: CVE-2018-17144 Full DisclosureHierarchical Deterministic Wallets
1 points · Open discussionThe paper outlines two attacks that a hash rate majority can undertake: (1) double-spending; and (2) sabotage (force a decline in exchange rate).
But there is a far more benign and profitable attack: collect all of the block reward. No need to tell anybody, and no need to upset users by double-spending. Business as usual.
In other words, establish a benevolent mining monopoly:
https://bitzuma.com/posts/bitcoins-end-game-the-benevolent-m...
The hash rate majority becomes an effective monopoly by censoring blocks from outside the cartel. The incentive is equal to half the block reward. If done properly and gradually, few users would notice. Nor would many care. Those who did would simply leave.
I suspect there's even a version of this attack in which a cartel makes public threats to censor blocks it disapproves of. This is, after all, what
Read the rest
BIP-9 does:
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0009.mediawi...
Using this approach, a cartel may be able to leverage a hash rate below 50% to 100%.
There's some precedent for this with UASF. The hash rate of the group threatening to censor blocks there was quite small (certainly below 50%). Depending on who you talk to, the threat of block censorship by this group was enough to shut down segwit2x.
If you want to read about something really interesting, check out hierarchical deterministic wallets:
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawi...
In Understanding Bitcoin Transactions> wonder if there's a cryptographically secure way to build a known "stream" of one-use tokens (addresses, if you will) based on known "public key."
This is what Bitcoin's BIP-47[1] does, but you can hand that "public key" to anyone[2]. The communication layer in this case is the Bitcoin blockchain.
[1] https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0047.mediawi...
[2] https://paynym.is/
In Sunsetting Tor MessengerThe checksum in a 12-word seed is only 4 bits. This means you could absolutely pick 12 random words using nothing but a dice. When importing the seed on a hardware wallet, if it complains that the seed is invalid (because the checksum is invalid) just change the 12th word by picking the next one in the BIP39 list (https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039/english...). If it complains again, tries the next one. And so on. At most you may have to try 2⁴ = 16 different words. One of them will pass the checksum. And there you go, you have a valid seed that was generated with a simple dice roll, without the need for custom code running on an MCU or offline computer.
Edit: BTW your method of calling MicroPython uos.urandom() to generate the seed is not necessarily safe! The MicroPython API does not guarantee the entropy always comes
Read the rest
from a secure hardware RNG. Just "when possible". This means depending on your MicroPython version, how the framework was compiled, what exact revision of the ESP8266, entropy may or may not come from a secure hardware RNG. As a former InfoSec professional reviewing hardware/firmware/software security-related code, I often found flaws at many levels in this area.
Edit #2: In fact, after more looking into it, the current version of MicroPython relies on an undocumented register (https://web.archive.org/web/20160417080207/http://esp8266-re...) that "seems" to be a hardware RNG however it has never been determined if it is suitable to use for cryptographic purposes. It would be a lot safer to generate your seed on an offline Linux laptop booted of a Live USB or equivalent (with no storage device), using the good old cryptographically-secure getrandom(2) syscall than blindly trusting an undocumented sketchy ESP8266 register whose implementation is completely unknown. If I were you I would discard any wallet created using your ESP8266 code.
Bitcoin transactions support multiple inputs and multiple outputs (transactions involving multiple input and multiple output "accounts").
For example, Satoshi Nakamoto would need to use multiple accounts as inputs for any single transaction greater than 50 BTC. Those accounts were created prior to the development of the Hierarchical Deterministic Wallet spec (BIP32) [0]. From reading only the abstract cross-posted here, it sounds like the linked patent filling from 2016 is describing something very similar to the "Per-office balances: m/iH" use case described in BIP32 [1]; which is indeed prior art from 2012 [0].
With Bitcoin HD Wallets, there is no distinction between a private key and an account. With an HD Wallet, there is a private parent key and there are private child keys which are derived from the private parent key. Each private
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child key is a distinct "account". Multiple Bitcoin wallet softwares support the 2012 BIP32 HD Wallet spec.
[0]
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawi...
[1] https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawi...