sjcl

Well any website serious about security - yes. But if a single website decides to do it it would work fine. It would be quite easy to just add a js file with this. For example this one for the Stanford JS Crypto Library: https://github.com/bitwiseshiftleft/sjcl/blob/master/core/sh... We're currently putting the onus on the end user (who are mostly apathetic), when really the onus should be on the websites.

I'm not following his reason for writing this. In part 2 he says he doesn't care about the performance hit from a crypto library that implements a system TRNG, sooooo, use that? https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Crypto/getR... Or even study the thread on entropy pool paranoia from the Stanford Javascript Crypto Library: https://github.com/bitwiseshiftleft/sjcl/issues/77 /scratches head at FAIC/

Curious why in your FAQ at 0bin.net you say: But JavaScript encryption is not secure! Is there something inherently insecure about the JS crypto library you're using (https://github.com/bitwiseshiftleft/sjcl)?

Looks like SJCL can do exactly that: https://github.com/bitwiseshiftleft/sjcl/blob/master/core/ra...

From looking at "upload.js" you are using AES in counter mode. var aesCtr = new aesjs.ModeOfOperation.ctr(encryptionKeyBytes, new aesjs.Counter(-1)); Please use https://github.com/bitwiseshiftleft/sjcl which supports a very high-level sjcl.encrypt(passphrase, plaintext) API and has been audited, instead of using crypto primitives. One specific issue is you are only encrypting, not authenticating, so if the servers are compromised someone could send back a fake plaintext.

The WebCrypto API is meant to solve this but many aspects of it are not quite ready for production yet. I'd personally love to see JS crypto libraries like CryptoJS, SJCL and Forge start implementing polyfills for WebCrypto. Even just using the getRandomValues method (which seems to be fairly stable across all modern browsers) for their PRNG implementations would result in a much more theoretically sound crypto library. http://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/ https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge https://github.com/bitwiseshiftleft/sjcl https://code.google.com/p/crypto-js/

Why not add the Stanford Javascript Crypto Library to this, to address the concern mentioned by jabgrabdthrow? https://github.com/bitwiseshiftleft/sjcl I'm not saying that's going to plug all holes but maybe it can be one piece.

If the maintainer is reading this, I submitted a pull request that significantly speeds up CCM encryption by using arraybuffers. I'd love to see it merged in: https://github.com/bitwiseshiftleft/sjcl/pull/89

1. As discussed in another comment, this requires a similar level of trust to encrypting the data on the server. The only difference here is that, to the best of my knowledge, an attacker who took control of the server, could silently log the plaintexts in the server side case while some indication would be provided in the client-side case. Most wouldn't notice it but some would eventually. 2. The code I wrote isn't obfuscated. The code at the top is just SJCL and angular.js which are https://github.com/bitwiseshiftleft/sjcl and https://github.com/angular/angular.js

What is wrong with sjcl's PBKDF2? https://github.com/bitwiseshiftleft/sjcl/blob/master/core/pb... It looks like there will be no CFB in sjcl: https://github.com/bitwiseshiftleft/sjcl/issues/7