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bluejekyll
trust-dns
Networking2016–2023
bluejekyll / trust-dns

trust-dns

Discover this repository through its Hacker News conversations.

11Distinct people
27Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
10GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

A public description has not been verified.

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

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This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 11:34:28 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year27 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-03-19 23:51:51 UTC to 2023-10-07 02:39:37 UTC.

02468102016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 2 submissions, 5 comments20162017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 9 mentions; 0 submissions, 9 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments20192020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2023

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC725
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC909
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

7 sources
I think I completely agree with you: > the protocol should be redesigned to assume online signers, taking advantage of cryptography in every transaction. When you say online signers, do you mean not actively storing RRSIG records for RR sets at all? Or do you mean dynamically resigning the zone after any update? I think there is a benefit to these records in validating they originate with zone from which they claim to be. The biggest concern I have right now with the protocol is that having multiple nodes being responsible for managing a zone is difficult because each has to be signed by the parent zone, though with the necessary automated support, this shouldn't be hard to overcome (i.e. makes HA harder). > Resolver-server encrypted transactions also solve the problem of endpoint signature validation (because there's no weak link between
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servers and clients anymore) Do you have any thoughts on DNS over TLS vs DNSCrypt? I got halfway through implementing DNSCrypt, but I have some concerns about it being easily exploitable for DOS attacks. And am switching to DNS over TLS for now. > Daniel Bernstein, among others, was smart enough to realize that if you encrypt the connection between a resolver and a server, you don't really even need signatures anymore... Yes, this is true, but the concerns I've had with this are 1) ability to cache data and 2) ability to add nodes to the network. While I completely agree with this, we need to come up with a method that allows new nodes to be added to the graph, which might be cumbersome from a resolver perspective. In terms of zone authorities it should be relatively straightforward though. With the current DNSSec design, it allows for trusted data to be stored on untrusted nodes in the graph, making cached data straightforward. If you don't mind, I'd love your feedback on a project I've been working on for the last year: https://github.com/bluejekyll/trust-dns I want to try and deal with many of these aspects of the protocol, from the slant of making it easier to setup and operate. I currently don't have a lot of documentation around operations, as I'm still focused on implementing some things like DNS over TLS. I'd love to bake some of these concepts into the software, so if you have any feedback that would be awesome.
In The DNSSEC master key securing DNS is about to change

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