magnetico

search result pages. As a consequence, things like `awesome-*` lists ( https://github.com/bayandin/awesome-awesomeness ) are a good starting point for a decentralized curated catalogue that could cover that use case. So you could imagine a curated catalogue of programming websites compiled as a few hundred megabyte file, it could pretty much cover your interest boundaries, and as a file this can be shared over Dat today very easily. Want to search another 'interest boundary'? Run the same search software but on a different catalogue file. These things are possible. In other words, centralization is overestimated. Maybe there are a couple of genuine centralized-middleman use cases but most of use cases can be very well covered by decentralization.

: https://sourceforge.net/projects/aresgalaxy/editorial/?sourc... https://github.com/lmatteis/torrent-net https://github.com/boramalper/magnetico The problem with distributed search is that perfecting it is hard - bittorrent has won out because websites could be used to prevent spamming of malware, track reputation and discussion of torrents and individuals, etc. Tribler has some proposed alternatives here and I seem to remember Kad having done a decent job preventing this from becoming a significant problem, but it never had the popularity. If someone manages to knock out all the big torrent and usenet indexes overnight, these systems will become a lot more necessary and probably get a lot more popular.

have shown the scale of the on-going activities. We must stress that we have no concrete proof of actual malicious activities; our work only shows that the scale of attacks is large enough for this to be a concern. Repeating for the last time (as I feel this slowly creeps into a flame war): 1. As I have said, these technique is already in use. This means that the network is more resilient than you claim and the chances that a few hundred (or thousand, in future) magnetico instances will harm the network is near zero. I could answer in a more direct way if you did not use rain forest metaphor and addressed the issues you see more directly. 2. magnetico uses a similar but also a lot different technique. The horizontal (Sybil) attack requires the offending node to maintain its identity: "First, the attacker only has to answer two types of messages, `PING` and `FIND_NODE`; he can ignore every other message."[0] magneticod, in contrast, answers only `GET_PEERS` and `ANNOUNCE_PEER` queries, which are essential for the remote node to register itself as a peer downloading the torrent. magneticod will send hundreds of `FIND_NODE` queries per second[1] using forged node IDs, and that's all! According to the BitTorrent DHT protocol[2], "after 15 minutes of inactivity, a node becomes questionable." Hence, presumably, magneticod should be forgotten & removed from the routing table after it does not answer several `PING` queries. Consider that `FIND_NODE` queries that magnetico makes are targetting (at every single time) totally random nodes, so same set of nodes will not be targeted ever (statistically speaking). The problem is, BEP 51 is still a draft and AFAIK no clients in the wild implements it, so it's simply impractical to write a DHT search-engine depending on this particular behaviour. Once it becomes more widespread (hopefully together with BEP 42), magnetico will (and has to) drop its current technique and support the new and proper one. [0]: https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~lw525/publications/security.pdf [1]: https://github.com/boramalper/magnetico/blob/257912a12f862d9... [2]: http://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0005.html