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wycheproof
Go2016–2026
C2SP / wycheproof

wycheproof

Project Wycheproof tests crypto libraries against known attacks.

15Distinct people
18Mentions
2Explicit recommenders
3.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Project Wycheproof tests crypto libraries against known attacks.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

Excellent essay, highly recommended. > With the popularity of Curve25519 and the desire for cryptographers to design more exotic protocols with it, the cofactor value of 8…

loup-vaillant used a recommendation phrase. 2 indexed comments match. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 12:01:57 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year18 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-12-19 18:06:37 UTC to 2026-05-14 01:01:39 UTC.

012342016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments20162017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 1 submissions, 3 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC413
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110

What Hacker News says

3 sources
tl;dr: the conclusion of the EdDSA part of the article is wrong. EdDSA has its problems, but malleability is not one of them, if one is following RFC 8032. >There are several ways to sign a document with EdDSA, and produce a valid signature. The three sources of malleability are: >We can add a multiple of L (the order of the prime subgroup) to s. Recall that B has order L as well, so it will absorb any cofactor. Basically everything happens modulo L, so adding L won't change a thing. This is prevented in RFC 8032 by checking that 0 <= s < L. Tink [1] does this check, and therefore is malleability free. >We can sign the same message with a different nonce r. This requires knowledge of the secret key a. This proves that the signature of a message is not unique -- that is the signer can product multiple signatures -- but I haven't seen anyon
Read the rest
e calling this a malleability issue. Malleability is about taking a triple (public key, signature message) and tweaking bits to produce another valid triple. >We can add a low order point to A, and subtract it from R. That way we produce a valid signature, but from a public key nobody vouches for. If the verifier checks the weaker equation, we can add a low order point to just R, and produce a "valid" signature with the same public key. This is the second time I saw this claim. When I first saw it [2], I thought, wait, this test is missing in Wycheproof [3], but Bleichenbacher does NOT miss anything. That's when I knew it's wrong. Modifying A or R instantly makes the signature invalid. Using the article's notation, the signature is validated by checking that B.s.8 == R.8 + A.h.8, where h = SHA-512(R, A, M) and M is the message Multiplying the cofactor or not doesn't matter, doesn't introduce any weakness, as implied by the article. If R or A is changed, h will change. [1] https://github.com/google/tink [2] https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/ed25519-dalek/issues/2... [3] https://github.com/google/wycheproof. Wycheproof has tests for EdDSA malleability, but it only tests if s is not properly range checked.
In Cofactor Explained: Clearing Elliptic Curves' dirty little secret

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