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wycheproof
Go2016–2026
C2SP / wycheproof

wycheproof

Project Wycheproof tests crypto libraries against known attacks.

15Distinct people
18Mentions
2Explicit recommenders
3.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Project Wycheproof tests crypto libraries against known attacks.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

Excellent essay, highly recommended. > With the popularity of Curve25519 and the desire for cryptographers to design more exotic protocols with it, the cofactor value of 8…

loup-vaillant used a recommendation phrase. 2 indexed comments match. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 12:01:57 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year18 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-12-19 18:06:37 UTC to 2026-05-14 01:01:39 UTC.

012342016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments20162017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 1 submissions, 3 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC413
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110

What Hacker News says

2 sources
Interestingly, EdDSA (generally known as Ed25519) does not need as many checks as ECDSA, and assuming the public key is valid, an all-zero signature will be rejected with the main checks. All you need to do is verify the following equation: R = SB - Hash(R || A || M) A Where R and S are the two halves of the signature, A is the public key, and M is the message (and B is the curve's base point). If the signature is zero, the equation reduces to Hash(R || A || M)A = 0, which is always false with a legitimate public key. And indeed, TweetNaCl does not explicitly check that the signature is not zero. It doesn't need to. However. There are still ways to be clever and shoot ourselves in the foot. In particular, there's the temptation to convert the Edwards point to Montgomery, perform the scalar multiplication there, then convert back (doubles
Read the rest
the code's speed compared to a naive ladder). Unfortunately, doing that introduces edge cases that weren't there before, that cause the point we get back to be invalid. So invalid in fact that adding it to another point gives us zero half the time or so, causing the verification to succeed even though it should have failed! (Pro tip: don't bother with that conversion, variable time double scalarmult https://loup-vaillant.fr/tutorials/fast-scalarmult is even faster.) A pretty subtle error, though with eerily similar consequences. It looked like a beginner-nuclear-boyscout error, but my only negligence there was messing with maths I only partially understood. (A pretty big no-no, but I have learned my lesson since.) Now if someone could contact the Whycheproof team and get them to fix their front page so people know they have EdDSA test vectors, that would be great. https://github.com/google/wycheproof/pull/79 If I had known about those, the whole debacle could have been avoided. Heck, I bet my hat their ECDSA test vectors could have avoided the present Java vulnerability. They need to be advertised better.
In Psychic Signatures in Java

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