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cabforum
servercert
Web Development2016–2026
cabforum / servercert

servercert

Repository for the CA/Browser Forum Server Certificate Chartered Working Group

Web DevelopmentSystems & InfrastructureCommunication & Social
Explore on GitHubRead Hacker News discussions
13Distinct people
19Mentions
1Explicit recommenders
241GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Repository for the CA/Browser Forum Server Certificate Chartered Working Group

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

Except it's not actually true. https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/clients.html highlights that many clients support standard SSL features without having to update to fix bugs. How…

lstamour used a recommendation phrase. One indexed comment matches. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 1:49:46 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year19 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-05-27 04:13:48 UTC to 2026-02-18 02:31:50 UTC.

02462016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments20162017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 3 submissions, 3 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC633
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

19 sources
agwa·Feb 18, 2026
It doesn't comply with one or more root store policies (which all incorporate the Baseline Requirements by reference, which incorporate various specs, such as RFC5280, by reference). Mozilla root store policy: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/secu... Chrome root store policy: https://googlechrome.github.io/chromerootprogram/ Apple root store policy: https://www.apple.com/certificateauthority/ca_program.html Baseline Requirements: https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/main/docs/BR.md There are countless examples of non-compliant certificates documented in the Bugzilla component I linked above. A recent example: a certificate which was backdated by more than 48 hours, in violation of section 7.1.2.7 of the Baseline Requirements: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2016672
In Google Public CA is down
hackcoughgasp·Apr 23, 2025
I know this thread is over, but it's important to understand that it's the browsers who have all the power in CABF and they were the drivers behind this change. Apple proposed it and Google voted yes within minutes of the voting period opening. It was unanimous among CAs too (with 5 abstentions), and nobody really disagrees with it, but it was the browsers who started the initiative now. The article links to the vote thread: https://groups.google.com/a/groups.cabforum.org/g/servercert... And here's the CABF discussion before the vote: https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/553/commits/69ce...
In TLS certificate lifetimes will officially reduce to 47 days
lstamour·Jan 5, 2025Recommendation phrase
Except it's not actually true. https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/clients.html highlights that many clients support standard SSL features without having to update to fix bugs. How much SSL you choose to allow and what configurations is between you and your... I dunno, PCI-DSS auditor or something. I'm not saying SSL isn't complicated, it absolutely is. And building on top of it for newer HTTP standards has its pros and cons. Arguably though, a "simple" checkbox is all you would need to support multiple types of SSL with a CDN. Picking how much security you need is then left to an exercise to the reader. ... that said, is weak SSL better than "no SSL"? The lock icon appearing on older clients that aren't up to date is misleading, but then many older clients didn't mark non-SSL pages as insecure either, so there are tradeoffs either way. But e
Read the rest
nabling SSL by default doesn't have to exclude clients necessarily. As long as they can set the time correctly on the client, of course. I've intentionally not mentioned expiring root CAs, as that's definitely an inherent problem to the design of SSL and requires system or browser patching to fix. Likewise https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/553 highlights that some browsers are very much encouraging frequent expiry and renewal of SSL certificates, but that's a system administration problem, not technically a client or server version problem. As an end user who tries to stay up to date, I've just downloaded recent copies of Firefox on older devices to get an updated list of SSL certificates. My problem with older devices tends to be poor compatibility with IPv6 (an addon in XP SP2/SP3 not enabled by default), and that web developers tend to use very modern CSS and web graphics that aren't supported on legacy clients. On top of that, you've HTML5 form elements, what displays when responsive layouts aren't available (how big is the font?), etc. Don't get me wrong, I love the idea of backwards compatibility but it's a lot more work for website authors to test pages in older or obscure browsers and fix the issues they see. Likewise, with SSL you can test on a legacy system to see how it works or run Qualys SSL checker, for example. Browsers maintain forwards-compatibilty but only to a point (see ActiveX, Flash in some contexts, Java in many places, the <blink> tag, framesets, etc.) So ultimately compatibility is a choice authors make based on how much time they put into testing for it. It is not a given, even if you use a subset of features. Try using Unicode on an early browser, for example. I still remember the rails snowman trick to get IE to behave correctly.
In Web page annoyances that I don't inflict on you
michaelt·Sep 11, 2024
The current CAB Forum Baseline Requirements call for "Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration" [1] i.e. make sure the DNS or HTTP challenge looks the same from several different data centres in different countries. By the end of 2026, CAs will validate from 5 different data centres. This should make getting a cert via BGP hijack very difficult. [1] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/main/docs/BR.md#...
In We spent $20 to achieve RCE and accidentally became the admins of .mobi
agwa·Jul 30, 2024
There's no prohibition against issuing certificates for names on the Public Suffix List. BR 3.2.2.6 prohibits issuing a wildcard certificate for an entire public suffix unless the "Applicant proves its rightful control of the entire Domain Namespace" (without specifying how this should be done - arguably, publishing a DNS record would qualify) but also says that CAs should use the "ICANN DOMAINS" section of the PSL only, not the "PRIVATE DOMAINS" section, so domains for dynamic DNS providers and the like wouldn't be included. [https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/main/docs/BR.md#...]
In DigiCert Revocation Incident (CNAME Domain Validation)
agwa·Aug 30, 2021
No, they don't have to MitM the CA's domain validation request. While they have brief control over the website, they use domain validation method 3.2.2.4.18 (Agreed-Upon Change to Website v2)[1] or 3.2.2.4.19 (Agreed-Upon Change to Website - ACME)[2] to legitimately complete domain validation by making a change to the website. Due to domain validation reuse[3], the certificate doesn't have to be issued right away. The attacker can wait and request the certificate up to 398 days later, without having to do domain validation again. [1] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/cda0f92ee70121fd... [2] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/cda0f92ee70121fd... [3] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/cda0f92ee70121fd...
In MarkMonitor left 60k domains for the taking
achew22·Mar 24, 2021
The article you linked to is kind of confused and I'm not sure I blame them. This stuff is really complex! According to the proposal[0], leaf certificates are prohibited from being signed with a validity window of more than 397 days by a CA/B[1] compliant Certificate authority. This is very VERY different from the cert not being valid. It means that a CA could absolutely make you a certificate that violated these rules. If a CA signed a certificate with a longer window, they would risk having their root CA removed from the CA/B trust store which would make their root certificate pretty much worthless. To validate this, you can look at the CA certificates that Google has[2] that are set to expire in 2036 (scroll down to "Download CA certificates" and expand the "Root CAs" section) several of which have been issued since that CA/B governanc
Read the rest
e change. As of right now, as far as I know, Chrome will continue to trust certificates that are signed with a larger window. I've not heard anything about browsers enforcing validity windows or anything like that, but would be delighted to find out the ways that I'm wrong if you can point me to a link. Further, your home made root certificate will almost certainly not be accepted by CA/B into their trust store (and it sounds like you wouldn't want that) which means you're not bound by their governance. Feel free to issue yourself a certificate that lasts 1000 years and certifies that you're made out of marshmallows or whatever you want. As long as you install the public part of the CA into your devices it'll work great and your phone/laptop/whatever will be 100% sure you're made out of puffed sugar. I guess I have to disclose that I'm an xoogler who worked on certificate issuance infrastructure and that this is my opinion, that my opinons are bad and I should feel bad :zoidberg:. [0] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/138/commits/2b06... [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CA/Browser_Forum [2] https://pki.goog/repository/
In Chrome’s address bar will use https:// by default
prdonahue·Mar 30, 2018
As the person who placed the order, yes you definitely can :) Starting November 1, 2015 [1], you could no longer obtain certificates for "Reserved IP Addresses" [2] and any still in existence on October 1, 2016 had to be revoked. Section 3.2.2.5 of the BRs indicate how one can demonstrate control over the IP address. -- 1 - https://github.com/cabforum/documents/blob/master/docs/BR.md... 2 - https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-address-space/ipv4-add...; http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-address-space/ipv6-addr... 3 - https://github.com/cabforum/documents/blob/master/docs/BR.md...
In 1.1.1.1 Cloudflare DNS Resolver Soon to Be Announced?

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