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caddyserver
caddy-docker
Dockerfile2021–2023
caddyserver / caddy-docker

caddy-docker

Source for the official Caddy v2 Docker Image

5Distinct people
5Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
587GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Source for the official Caddy v2 Docker Image

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 1:49:46 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month5 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2021-01-03 09:35:05 UTC to 2023-07-04 04:23:04 UTC.

0122021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 commentsJan 20212021-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsApr 20222022-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2022-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2022-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsJul 2023

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Jan 20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-02-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Feb 20212021-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20212021-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20212021-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20212021-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20212021-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20212021-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20212021-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20212021-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20212021-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20212021-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20212021-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20222022-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20222022-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20222022-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20222022-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-06-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Jun 20222022-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-07-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Jul 20222022-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20222022-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20222022-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20222022-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20222022-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20222022-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20232023-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20232023-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20232023-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20232023-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20232023-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20232023-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-08-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

5 sources
I use https://static-web-server.net/ Cross-platform, written in Rust, straightforward configuration, secure defaults, also has a hardened container image and a hardened NixOS module. I wouldn't recommend Caddy. Their official docker image runs as root by default [1], and they don't provide a properly sandboxed systemd unit file [2]. [1]: https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy-docker/issues/104 [2]: https://github.com/caddyserver/dist/blob/master/init/caddy.s... EDITED: phrasing
In Hunting for Nginx alias traversals in the wild
How prevalent is XDG? The only place I have seen it used is on [Caddy's Dockerfile]. The defaults do not seem to match what the [Filesystem Hierarchy Standard] is proposing, but they do seem reasonable: # user data (/usr/share) XDG_DATA_HOME="${XDG_DATA_HOME:-$HOME/.local/share}" # config files (/etc) XDG_CONFIG_HOME="${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}" # cache files (/usr/share) XDG_CACHE_HOME="${XDG_CACHE_HOME:-$HOME/.cache}" # state files (/var/lib) XDG_STATE_HOME="${XDG_STATE_HOME:-$HOME/.local/state}" [Caddy's Dockerfile]: https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy-docker/blob/master/Dockerfile.tmpl#L40 [Filesystem Hierarchy Standard]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filesystem_Hierarchy_Standard
In The Power of the XDG Base Directory Specification (2019)
I appreciate the reply. I took some time to look at your example so I can give some feedback on where I end up when I think about building / maintaining my own image. My immediate reaction is that the example is nice as a one-off build, but it's much more complex if I need to set up something I can maintain long term. I might be overthinking it, but in the context of thinking about something I can maintain my thought process is below. The questions are mostly rhetorical. First, what versions am I getting? Does using `2.5.1-builder` result in a customer built binary that's version `2.5.1`? The command usage [1] of the `xcaddy` command says it falls back to the `CADDY_VERSION` environment variable if it's not set explicitly. Since it's not set explicitly, I go looking for that variable in the Dockerfile [2]. That's some templating lan
Read the rest
guage I'm not familiar with and I can't track down where the variable gets set, at least not quickly. I'd probably have to spend an hour learning how those templates work to figure it out. To make a quicker, educated guess, it most likely matches the builder version. The docs said the version can be set to any git ref, so I can explicitly set it to v2.5.1 on the command line [3] to be certain. Now, what version of `caddy-dns/cloudflare` am I getting? The xcaddy custom builds section of the docs [4] says the version can optionally be specified, but it's not specified in the above example. There aren't any tags in the repo, so it's probably building off `master`. The doc says it functions similar to `go get`, but doesn't explain what the differences are and the default behavior isn't explained either. The docs for `go get` [6] say it can use a revision, so maybe a specific commit can be used for that, but I'd need to test it since I'm not super familiar with Golang. What other risks come along with building and maintaining my own custom image? I could end up with a subtly broken build that only occurs in my environment. Portability doesn't guarantee compatibility [7] and building custom images increases the risk of compatibility issues beyond what I get with official images (building and running vs just running). That blog post is a really cool read on it's own BTW. I need to consider the potential for breakage even if it's miniscule because my Docker infrastructure is self hosted and will be sitting behind my custom built Caddy image. If my custom image breaks, I need a guaranteed way of having access to a previous, known good version. This is as simple as publishing the images externally, but adds an extra step since I'll need an account at a registry and need to integrate pushes to that registry into my build. If I build a custom image, do I let other people I help with the odd tech thing use it or is all the effort for me only? I don't want to become the maintainer of a Docker image others rely on, so I can't even re-use any related config if I help others in the future since they won't have access to the needed image. To be fair, I also see things I don't like in the NGINX Proxy Manager Dockerfile [7]. The two that immediately jump out at me are things I consider common mistakes. Both require unlucky timing to fail, but can technically cause failure IMO. The first is using `apt-get update` which will exit 0 on failure and has the potential to leave `apt-get install` running against obsolete versions. The second is using `apt-get update` in multiple parts of a multistage build. If I were doing it I'd run `apt-get update` in a base image and avoid it in the builder + runtime images to guarantee the versions stay the same between the build container and the runtime container. It took me about 1h to work through that and write this comment, so it's not just a matter of building a Docker image and plugging in the config. There's a lot of nuance that goes into maintaining a Docker image (I'm sure you know that already) and not having an image with the DNS plugin(s) baked in is a show stopper for anyone like me that can't justify maintaining their own. Also, a 4 line Docker file looks nice in terms of being simple, but explicitly declaring or even adding comments describing some of the things I pointed out above can save people a lot of time. Even comments with links to the relevant portions of the docs would be super useful. My reason for wanting the Cloudflare DNS plugin is that I have some things I want to run 100% locally without ever exposing them to the internet. The desire for wildcard certificates is to keep things from being discoverable via CTLogs. I hope that's useful feedback. I realize someone bemoaning the difficulty of running your stuff at home lab / small business scale isn't exactly the target audience in terms of picking up customers that pay the bills. Thanks again for the reply / example. 1. https://github.com/caddyserver/xcaddy#command-usage 2. https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy-docker/blob/master/Dock... 3. https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/tree/v2.5.1 4. https://github.com/caddyserver/xcaddy#custom-builds 5. https://github.com/caddy-dns/cloudflare/tags 6. https://go.dev/ref/mod#go-get 7. https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/containers-understanding-diff... 8. https://github.com/NginxProxyManager/docker-nginx-full/blob/...
In NGINX Proxy Manager
I find it somewhat curious, that the article starts with listing examples where root user is used to run containers (amongst other issues): > Writing production-worthy Dockerfiles is, unfortunately, not as simple as you would imagine. Most Docker images in the wild fail here, and even professionals often[1] get[2] this[2] wrong[3]. And yet, in some of the linked URLs, people are presenting reasons for why that approach was used in particular, instead of the supposedly safer alternatives. For example, https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy-docker/issues/104 > We actually originally did run as non-root by default, but simplicity we decided to drop that (see #24, and also #103 for some other related discussion). > If your Dockerfile works for you, that's great. In most cases where users want to run as non-root, they also don't need to listen t
Read the rest
o :80/:443 in the container, so the setpcap magic isn't necessary at all. > It's also worth noting that caddy is an official image, and as such needs to be similarly-shaped to other official images of the same type. At a quick glance, none of nginx, traefik, httpd, or haproxy support running as non-root out of the box either. > Finally, it's worth considering why you want to run as non-root. What attack vectors are you trying to avoid? Container escape vulnerabilities are pretty much the only real risk, but anyone running a modern Docker version is immune to many of them. It's also worth considering user namespace remapping as a mitigation. In my experience the main reason for running as non-root is to pass compliance checks - not a bad reason, but it's also worth recognizing that non-compliance does not automatically equal decreased security (and vice-versa). If larger projects, like Nginx, Traefik, Httpd and HAProxy were all creating containers like that, it makes you think about the reasoning behind it. Is it easier to just run containers as root and not worry about the permissions inside of the container? If so, wouldn't it really make more sense for the container runtime to have some sort of mechanisms in place to allow people to do what's easy within the containers while also making sure that it has no harmful impact outside of them? Because to me it seems like people will continuously take the path of least resistance and from where i stand, it should be up to the creators of the container technologies to make sure that this path is safe by default.
In Dockerfile Best Practices

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