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certifi
python-certifi
Python2015–2026
certifi / python-certifi

python-certifi

(Python Distribution) A carefully curated collection of Root Certificates for validating the trustworthiness of SSL certificates while verifying the identity of TLS hosts.

Networking
Explore on GitHubRead Hacker News discussions
4Distinct people
4Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

(Python Distribution) A carefully curated collection of Root Certificates for validating the trustworthiness of SSL certificates while verifying the identity of TLS hosts.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 11:56:56 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year4 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2015-09-08 21:15:23 UTC to 2026-10-20 14:11:06 UTC.

0122015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments20152016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110

What Hacker News says

4 sources
skuhn·Nov 5, 2015
Good, they should accelerate it. However, I wish that Microsoft made it extremely clear in these announcements that root certificates are not subject to SHA-1 collision attacks. Certain people [1] have misunderstood the situation and removed trust for SHA-1 signed roots (and that project is definitely not alone). Mozilla's announcement [2] does draw a distinction, but it's quite easy to miss. CAs like Entrust are much more clear about this, since their business relies on it. It is security theater [3] to tell users that they shouldn't use a SHA-1 signed root if they want their connections to be secure. Security vulnerabilities need to be very simply and clearly communicated -- otherwise you get solutions based on preconceived notions and simplistic "X is always BAD" thinking that do more harm than good. In this instance, people have spent
Read the rest
days debugging connectivity issues and opening tickets with service providers. And the reasoning behind the move is not based in fact -- Mozilla has NOT removed SHA1 certs from their trusted roots [4] and they have announced no timetable in which to do so. It's simply because someone heard "SHA-1 is bad" and acted accordingly. The current SHA-1 deprecation push applies only to chain and end certificates, not to roots -- removing trust for SHA-1 signed roots is not necessary to prevent these sorts of attacks and it is much too soon to take that step in any environment that talks to systems which you don't control on the public Internet. [1] http://certifiio.readthedocs.org/ [2] https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2015/10/20/continuing-to-p... [3] https://github.com/certifi/python-certifi/issues/26#issuecom... [4] https://mozillacaprogram.secure.force.com/CA/IncludedCACerti...
In SHA-1 Deprecation Update

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