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classvsoftware
under-new-management
TypeScript2024–2025
classvsoftware / under-new-management

under-new-management

Detect when your installed extensions have changed owners.

Web Development
Explore on GitHubRead Hacker News discussions
5Distinct people
5Mentions
1Explicit recommenders
637GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Detect when your installed extensions have changed owners.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

This is a cool idea! However, I have a couple of reservations: 1. Firstly, the JavaScript code in the release version of the extension is 12MiB. This is a lot of code, with…

Sophira used a recommendation phrase. One indexed comment matches. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:03:16 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month5 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2024-03-06 19:21:31 UTC to 2025-12-11 16:58:22 UTC.

01232024-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 commentsMar 20242024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsJan 20252025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsDec 2025

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Mar 20242024-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC312
Apr 20242024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20242024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20242024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20242024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20242024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20242024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20242024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20242024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20242024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20252025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20252025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20252025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20252025-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20252025-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20252025-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20252025-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Sep 20252025-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20252025-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20252025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20252025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

5 sources
bjord·Dec 11, 2025
brutal. I just typed out a much longer response and lost it when my time wasting extension saw the url change (time for a text area cache extension?) you might find this useful: https://github.com/classvsoftware/under-new-management my port (and now fork): https://github.com/maxtheaxe/under-new-management-firefox they currently (PRs are welcome!) only check listing info. mine doesn't route requests through an external (non addon store) server. a couple PRs are overdue on mine due to linting making the diffs impossible. I'll get to it. (see the wxt-migration branch)
In Show HN: Local Privacy Firewall-blocks PII and secrets before ChatGPT sees them
pogue·Aug 4, 2025
With browser extensions becoming new attack vectors, we need some reliable way to determine if they're running suspicious or malicious code in them before they're able to deploy. It seems like not even Google can properly vet their extension before they're added to the extensions store. The only way I've found to try and detect these as an end user is by using an extension called Under New Management [1], which attempts to alert you if a browser extension has changed ownership, at which point you can pretty much assume they've been compromised. Other than that, I know of no way to attempt to detect these malicious and problematic extensions. If anyone has any suggestions, please share them. [1] https://github.com/classvsoftware/under-new-management
In Mozilla Firefox's extension store being flooded with malware
loginatnine·Mar 7, 2024
Good find! I've dug a bit and the extension, at least for now, does not send any metadata associated to your browser[1], only a comma separated list of extension IDs. Of course the IP could be easily used. Looking at the result from the API of one extension I had installed[2], it lists metadata associated to the developer. I've tried to use the `chrome.management.get(id)` Chrome API and it does not return this information, and there does not seem to be a way to get the content of the manifest.json programatically. Therefore, to do the job of the extension as it is, it does need an external source. [1]: https://github.com/classvsoftware/under-new-management/blob/... [2]: https://api.extensionboost.com/v1/developer?extension_ids=gh...
In Detect when your installed Chrome extensions have changed owners
Sophira·Mar 7, 2024Recommendation phrase
This is a cool idea! However, I have a couple of reservations: 1. Firstly, the JavaScript code in the release version of the extension is 12MiB. This is a lot of code, with much of it in a bundled form, making it very difficult (if not almost impossible) to verify them against the originals in the case of React, lodash, etc. 2. It seems like the code uses an external API[0] to find the current owners of the installed extensions. While I appreciate that this may be one of the only ways to do it (since I imagine Google themselves would not appreciate an extension programmatically accessing the Chrome Web Store to find the current owners) - and as far as I can see from the published code, it doesn't send any identifying data beyond what a normal Web request does, hence why I'm not identifying the site by name here - I would still urge cautio
Read the rest
n as it might still cause alarm to someone examining their Web traffic and seeing a suspicious domain name, as the sort of person who would be interested in this extension is more likely to also the sort of person who would watch their Web traffic closely. (I know I do.) In general, though, I love this idea and I hope it raises awareness of new owners looking to monetise existing extensions, and does something to reduce the likelihood of it occurring. [edit: Actually, on further investigation, it looks like the developer of this extension is also the developer behind ExtensionBoost[1] (the site that's hosting the API mentioned above), so there's no need to hide the name any more. Note that this may also indicate that the developer is using this to gather lists of installed extensions, to allow them to indicate 'related' extensions by popularity in ExBoost - but it's important to note that this is just speculation on my part!] [0] https://github.com/classvsoftware/under-new-management/blob/... [1] https://www.extensionboost.com/
In Detect when your installed Chrome extensions have changed owners

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