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nucleus
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coproduct-opensource / nucleus

nucleus

Enforced permissions for AI agents - policy + enforcement in one stack

2Distinct people
5Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
22GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Enforced permissions for AI agents - policy + enforcement in one stack

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 12:54:37 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by week5 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2026-02-02 13:25:50 UTC to 2026-07-02 03:01:37 UTC. Weeks start Monday, UTC.

012026-02-02 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-09 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 commentsFeb 22026-02-09 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsApr 132026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-18 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-18 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-25 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-25 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-08 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-06-08 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-15 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-15 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-22 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-22 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-29 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-29 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-06 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsJun 29

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Feb 22026-02-02 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-09 00:00:00 UTC110
Feb 92026-02-09 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 162026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 232026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 22026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 92026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 162026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 232026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 302026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC110
Apr 62026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 132026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 202026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 272026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC000
May 42026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC000
May 112026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-18 00:00:00 UTC000
May 182026-05-18 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-25 00:00:00 UTC110
May 252026-05-25 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 12026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-08 00:00:00 UTC101
Jun 82026-06-08 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-15 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 152026-06-15 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-22 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 222026-06-22 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-29 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 292026-06-29 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-06 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

5 sources
difc·Feb 2, 2026Submission

Show HN: Nucleus – enforced permission envelopes for AI agents (Firecracker)

I’ve been building Nucleus because most “agent security” is still policy-only: a config file that says “don’t do bad things,” while the agent can still do them. Nucleus is an OSS experiment that pairs a small, compositional permission model with runtime enforcement: *side effects are only reachable through an enforcing tool proxy*, inside a Firecracker microVM. The envelope is *non-escalating*: it can only tighten or terminate, never silently relax. What works today: * MCP tool proxy with *read / write / run* (enforced inside the microVM) * default-deny egress + DNS allowlist + iptables drift detection (fail-closed) on Linux * time + budget caps enforced * hash-chained audit log + HMAC approval tokens (scoped, expiring) for gated ops What’s missing (being upfront): * web/search tools exist in the model but aren’t wired to MCP yet * remote
Read the rest
append-only audit storage + attestation are still roadmap * early/rough; targeting “safe to run against sensitive codebases,” not “replace your local terminal” Most of the code was written with Anthropic tools; I’ve been leaning on tests/fuzzing/proptests to keep it honest. Would love feedback on: (1) dangerous capability combinations beyond the lethal trifecta, (2) what enforcement gaps you’d want closed first, (3) how you’d evaluate this vs gateway-only approaches.
3 points · Open discussion

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