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cr-marcstevens
sha1collisiondetection
C2017–2025
cr-marcstevens / sha1collisiondetection

sha1collisiondetection

Library and command line tool to detect SHA-1 collision in a file

17Distinct people
19Mentions
2Explicit recommenders
1.4KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Library and command line tool to detect SHA-1 collision in a file

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

Each new _unrelated_ SHA1 attack will need an update in SHA1DC. But it has to be truly unrelated, as the collision detection method is fairly robust. I recommend reading the…

theamk used a recommendation phrase. 2 indexed comments match. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 10:56:20 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year19 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2017-02-23 14:39:53 UTC to 2025-03-26 14:05:46 UTC.

02462017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 1 submissions, 6 comments20172018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC716
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

1 sources
GitHub Actions could use lock files, and they would be useful specifically for composite actions, but they don't really solve the full problem at hand. First, many GitHub Actions use a Docker image to do their work. This runs into basically the exact same problem in container land. So even if I pin the commit hash of an action, if that action doesn't pin the digest hash of its container image, then it's still ultimately a mutable reference. Second, lock files don't protect against officially distributed malware when you intentionally update your dependencies. The lock file is designed to produce a repeatable build, and that does protect against a lot of supply-chain attacks when you never change anything, but you generally can't get away with never changing anything forever. Third, commit hashes are SHA-1, and while it is exceedingly diff
Read the rest
icult to produce SHA-1 collisions through Git, it isn't impossible and it will only get easier over time. Git already technically has SHA-256 support but it's basically never used in the wild. This needs to be addressed sooner rather than later. EDIT: The third point may not be as practically pressing as I thought. While SHA-1 is broken and shouldn't be used in new protocols, the techniques to break it faster than brute-force can be detected [1], and GitHub already rejects commits that are flagged by the detector [2]. I still think Git should more aggressively use a better hash, and should also be designed to migrate to new hash algorithms more easily in the future, but at least there are mitigations against attacks. [1]: https://github.com/cr-marcstevens/sha1collisiondetection [2]: https://github.blog/news-insights/company-news/sha-1-collisi...
In Whose code am I running in GitHub Actions?

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