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crev-dev
cargo-crev
Rust2018–2025
crev-dev / cargo-crev

cargo-crev

A cryptographically verifiable code review system for the cargo (Rust) package manager.

24Distinct people
40Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
2.3KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

A cryptographically verifiable code review system for the cargo (Rust) package manager.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 2:04:58 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year40 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2018-08-22 12:43:20 UTC to 2025-09-14 14:42:03 UTC.

024682018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments20182019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 0 submissions, 5 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 8 mentions; 1 submissions, 7 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 1 submissions, 6 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 2 submissions, 5 comments2025

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC514
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC505
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC817
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC716
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC725

What Hacker News says

5 sources
cargo-geiger will recursively warn you of unsafe code in dependencies: https://github.com/anderejd/cargo-geiger It's not a silver bullet, it will show you areas where memory safety issues could arise, but doesn't necessarily prove the presence of memory safety issues. Memory safety issues aren't the only type of security bug so them being impossible also doesn't mean it's entirely safe. You can think of issues like injection attacks or faulty ACL logic happening without memory unsafety. There's also cargo-crev, which is an attempt at making a web of trust for reviews of third party packages: https://github.com/crev-dev/cargo-crev - for a longer form article on what crev's goals are and how it works, I found this explained it for me: https://wiki.alopex.li/ActuallyUsingCrev
In A Sad Day for Rust
No, you are basically right, but the number of nodes in the dependency tree doesn't really mean that you really have to review all of those. Usually you end up with a big basket of actual dependent projects, and with some versions for them (which leads to the big explosion of the number of nodes in the dep tree). Naturally it should be easy to specify a whitelist of licenses. (Of course then one has to decide whether to trust the package.json-s.) That said, security review is hard for any ecosystem. Go probably has inherent advantages compared to the JS ecosystem, simply by virtue of being younger, having a real standard library, being more focused (no browser vs nodeJS issues) etc. PS: there are projects that aim to do collaborative audit/review for Rust ( https://github.com/crev-dev/cargo-crev ) there should be something like that for t
Read the rest
he JS world. also there's the NPM "report vulnerability" feature.
In Always Review Your Dependencies, AGPL Edition

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