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danluu
post-mortems
Developer Tools2015–2026
danluu / post-mortems

post-mortems

A collection of postmortems. Sorry for the delay in merging PRs!

39Distinct people
41Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
12.7KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

A collection of postmortems. Sorry for the delay in merging PRs!

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 4:00:59 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year41 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2015-08-08 19:15:25 UTC to 2026-06-13 08:14:28 UTC.

02468102015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments20152016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 1 submissions, 3 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 9 mentions; 5 submissions, 4 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 2 submissions, 2 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 0 submissions, 5 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 3 submissions, 1 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 2 submissions, 1 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC413
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC954
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC422
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC505
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC431
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC321

From the project README

An excerpt from the repository, fetched Nov 13, 2026.

Read the project’s introduction
A List of Post-mortems! Table of Contents Config Errors Hardware/Power Failures Conflicts Time Database Uncategorized Other lists of postmortems Analysis Contributors Config Errors Allegro. E-commerce site went down after a sudden traffic spike caused by a marketing campaign. The outage was caused by a configuration error in cluster resource management which prevented more service instances from starting even though hardware resources were available. Amazon. A configuration change in the Seoul region incorrectly removed the setting that specifies the minimum healthy hosts for the EC2 DNS resolver fleet, so the system fell back to a very low default. The fleet's healthy host count dropped and in-VPC DNS queries from EC2 instances failed for ~84 minutes until capacity was manually restored. AWS added semantic config validation and per-hour throttling on host removal as remediations. CircleCI. A deploy changed the type of a field in the PostgreSQL database used by the job-distribution service. Newly-written rows used the new type and old rows used the old type, so the distributor's strict schema validation failed on each scan and it stopped distributing work. Rolling back made the rows written between the two deploys unreadable, so distribution kept failing; recovery required hand-deploying a build that ignored the offending field, plus manual scaling. CircleCI. An IAM-role gap permitted out-of-band changes to AWS WAF outside of CircleCI's Terraform pipeline; an operator performing what they believed were read-only investigation actions modified WAF in a way that began blocking legitimate traffic to the api.circleci.com and circleci.com CloudFront distributions. Because the change wasn't recorded in Terraform, responders deprioritized WAF as a suspect and chased CORS errors and recent deploys until automated drift detection surfaced the discrepancy. Cloudflare. A bad config (router rule) caused all of their edge routers to crash, taking down all of Cloudflare. Cloudflare. During a maintenance of their private backbone network, an engineer made a typo in the Atlanta datacenter network configuration, causing all traffic coming from America and Europe flowing to this only datacenter, crushing it. Cloudflare. An incorrect ordering of the disabled BGP advertised prefixes caused malfunction on 19 datacenters. Cloudflare. A change to our Tiered Cache system caused some requests to fail for users with status code 530. The impact lasted for almost six hours in total. We estimate that about 5% of all requests failed at peak. Because of the complexity of our system and a blind spot in our tests, we did not spot this when the change was released to our test environment. Cloudflare. Several Cloudflare services became unavailable for 121 minutes on January 24, 2023 due to an error releasing code that manages service tokens. The incident degraded a wide range of Cloudflare products including aspects of our Workers platform, our Zero Trust solution, and control plane functions in our content delivery network (CDN). Cloudflare. On 4 October 2023, Cloudflare experienced DNS resolution problems starting at 07:00 UTC and ending at 11:00 UTC. Some users of 1.1.1.1 or products like WARP, Zero Trust, or third party DNS resolvers which use 1.1.1.1 may have received SERVFAIL DNS responses to valid queries. We’re very sorry for this outage. This outage was an internal software error and not the result of an attack. In this blog, we’re going to talk about what the failure was, why it occurred, and what we’re doing to make sure this doesn’t happen again. Cloudflare. On 18 Nov. 2025, a change in permissions in a database in Cloudflare's bot-detection systems caused a file to be output that exceeded the limits of the software that runs that system. That file was propagated througout Cloudflare's network, causing a systemwide outage. Cloudflare. A configuration change to disable an internal WAF testing tool propagated globally without a gradual rollout, triggering a Lua exception in the proxy's rulesets module that caused HTTP 500 errors for customers using the Cloudflare Managed Ruleset. Cloudflare. A bug in an automated cleanup task queried the Addressing API incorrectly, causing the system to interpret all BYOIP prefixes as pending deletion and systematically remove them. Cloudflare. Human error during abuse remediation inadvertently disabled the R2 Gateway service instead of a specific endpoint, due to insufficient validation safeguards in admin tooling. Cloudflare. During credential rotation, the R2 engineering team accidentally deployed new storage credentials to the default environment instead of production by omitting the --env production flag, causing the R2 Gateway to fail authentication once old credentials were removed. Cloudflare. A newly deployed DDoS mitigation rule exposed a latent bug in the rate-limiting system where flawed cookie validation logic caused HTTP request handler processes to enter infinite loops consuming 100% CPU, propagating across data centers. Cloudflare. A deployment tool bug caused the production environment to reference a staging build version, routing traffic to an unauthorized endpoint returning HTTP 401 errors, cascading failures across Workers KV, Pages, Access, and Turnstile. Cloudflare. A React component bug in the dashboard caused excessive API calls to the Tenant Service due to an improperly configured dependency array, overwhelming the system and cascading into broader API and dashboard failures. Cloudflare. An automated routing policy configuration error removed prefix list filters from BGP export policies in Cloudflare's Miami router, causing it to advertise internal IPv6 prefixes to external peers and resulting in a route leak lasting 25 minutes. Datadog. A bad service discovery config in one of the clients brought down service discovery globally when a dependent client went down. Enom. On January 15, 2022, at 9:00 AM ET, Tucows’ engineering team began planned mainte
Read the full README on GitHub

What Hacker News says

4 sources
To me, it looks like just 'Your account details are safe.' > Additionally, Dell cybersecurity measures are in place to limit the impact of any potential exposure. These include the hashing of our customers’ passwords and a mandatory Dell.com password reset. Hashed, how? Still using MD5? Is there even a salt? Verified, by whom? Tim's brother-in-law's new startup who have no security expert staff? Verified as in had the encryption technique tested for collisions? That Dell were using it in the correct manner? Or just, 'Hey, I know that library, it works if you use it right.' > Dell also retained a digital forensics firm to conduct an independent investigation Who? Is this just someone who will tick boxes? Or is it a group who know what they're doing? Or were they just hired by marketing based on a pretty website? > We are disclosing this in
Read the rest
cident now based on findings communicated to us by our independent digital forensics firm about the attempted extraction. Wait... This investigation has already been done? Okay... They would have told you a hell of a lot more than you're telling us... So we can't look forward to more information? > Though it is possible some of this information was removed from Dell’s network, our investigations found no conclusive evidence that any was extracted. > Credit card and other sensitive customer information was not targeted. One cannot be said conclusively, whilst the other can... Why? Tell us that CC data is kept separately, and tell us it is safe too. Just saying it's hashed doesn't mean bupkus, so feel free to say it publicly, you reveal nothing about your security features. > The potentially extracted customer information is limited to names, email addresses and hashed passwords. There is no conclusive evidence any customer information was extracted. Additionally, Dell cybersecurity measures are in place to limit the effects of a potential exposure. What additional cybersecurity measures? If the data is gone, it's in the wind. Names, and emails and possibly-breakable passwords. Are you talking about how you closed the hole? Then say how you accidentally exposed your victims. --- Finally, before anyone says that this is an excessive amount of information for Dell to give out... It's what other tech companies relay in their post-mortems. [0] All this is, is Dell admitting they had a problem. Not saying what that problem was, and not saying what they're doing to prevent it in future. And assuring their victims that they're taking care of them, despite their victims possibly sitting on lost information (a password, possibly in the wild) for nearly a month. [0] https://github.com/danluu/post-mortems
In Dell announces security breach
aaaazzzz·Apr 8, 2018Submission

Ask HN: How to prepare for a 'troubleshooting' interview?

I recently had an on site at Google for a Systems SRE position. I did not get the job and the feedback that my recruiter gave me was that the hiring committee found my performance in the 'troubleshooting' interview to be lacking. I guess nothing can beat the experience of actually dealing with outages but I was wondering if anyone has suggestions on additional resources for this kind of interview. The one's that I'm aware of: * The troubleshooting chapter in the Google SRE book * https://jvns.ca/zines/ * http://www.brendangregg.com/linuxperf.html * Reading about past outages: https://github.com/danluu/post-mortems Thank you very much!
2 points · Open discussion

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