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dart-lang
pub
Dart2018–2026
dart-lang / pub

pub

The pub command line tool

8Distinct people
8Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

The pub command line tool

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:56:07 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year8 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2018-07-28 01:34:04 UTC to 2026-01-20 03:54:19 UTC.

01232018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments20182019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments20222023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

8 sources
> Or is that nonsense? Yes, that is nonsense. 1) secret scanning can be disabled (not even sure it's enabled by default). 2) the regexes are fairly specific, length limited, etc. 3) github is obviously reviewing regexes that are accepted. Check the list of stuff supported: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/secret-scanning/sec... A bit sad, they don't publish the list of regexes, etc. -------------- I added a similar thing to the package manager for Dart / Flutter, because we saw users accidentally publishing secrets. That code is public, it relies on regexes and entropy estimation: https://github.com/dart-lang/pub/blob/eb8ee21a089ebe0f2c2dd8... It was heavily inspired by the researchers in: https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/nd... Worth a read, and certainly provides motivation for Github to do this kind of w
Read the rest
ork :D (disclosure: I work for Google. The opinions stated here are my own)
In Tencent WeChat is now a GitHub secret scanning partner
> I don't think there's any clear argument you can make on first principles for which of those is actually the case. I don't understand why someone would try to argue from first principles here, it just seems like such a bizarre approach. Anyway, it's not just a security issue. Malicious packages and security fixes are only part of the picture. Other issues: - Despite a team's promise to use semantic versioning, point releases & "bugfix" releases will break downstream users - Other systems for determining the versions to use are much more unpredictable and hard to understand than estimated (look at Dart and Cargo) https://github.com/dart-lang/pub/blob/master/doc/solver.md https://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/blob/1ef1e0a12723ce9548d7...
In How Go mitigates supply chain attacks
The first package installer I was aware of that used a SAT solver was SUSE's, back when Yum's solver was extremely primitive and would regularly fail to find a solution. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZYpp I think using a SAT solver for package installation arose out of dealing with much more complex requirements than are likely to arise in a Go project. The Smart package installer used heuristics to find a solution depending upon the operation: https://bazaar.launchpad.net/~smartpm/smart/trunk/view/head:... Poetry, Cocoapods, and Dart are all apparently using this SAT solver: https://github.com/dart-lang/pub/blob/master/doc/solver.md FWIW, I wrote a package installer that worked with RPMs, Solaris packages and AIX packages about 15 years ago and ended up with a minimal version selection similar to vgo. I wasn't a genius or anything... I j
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ust wasn't aware of SAT solvers at the time and it was the simplest thing that worked.
In A response about dep and vgo

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