DEDesoPK·Jun 20, 2026Submission
Kernhelm: A Linux authority wall for untrusted agents
2 points · Open discussionDeso-PK
make-trust-irrelevant
Systems & Infrastructure2026–2026
Deso-PK / make-trust-irrelevant
make-trust-irrelevant
Kernel-enforced authority and runtime security for Linux systems, autonomous software, and AI agents.
2Distinct people
3Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
11GitHub stars
What to know before exploring
What it is
Kernel-enforced authority and runtime security for Linux systems, autonomous software, and AI agents.
GitHub
Where it is used
No documented product use has been verified yet.
What people are saying
No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.
No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.
Also in these discussions
No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.
This week on Hacker News
Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 5:04:57 PM UTC.
No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.
Mentions over time
HN mentions by week3 dated mentions
Observed mentions: 2026-02-07 03:12:47 UTC to 2026-06-20 00:16:41 UTC. Weeks start Monday, UTC.
Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.
View mention counts and date ranges
| Period | Start (UTC) | End (exclusive, UTC) | Mentions | Submissions | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 2 | 2026-02-02 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-02-09 00:00:00 UTC | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Feb 9 | 2026-02-09 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Feb 16 | 2026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Feb 23 | 2026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2 | 2026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 9 | 2026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 16 | 2026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 23 | 2026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 30 | 2026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Apr 6 | 2026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Apr 13 | 2026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Apr 20 | 2026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Apr 27 | 2026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| May 4 | 2026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| May 11 | 2026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-05-18 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| May 18 | 2026-05-18 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-05-25 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| May 25 | 2026-05-25 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Jun 1 | 2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-06-08 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Jun 8 | 2026-06-08 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-06-15 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Jun 15 | 2026-06-15 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-06-22 00:00:00 UTC | 1 | 1 | 0 |
What Hacker News says
3 sourcesMake Trust Irrelevant: A Gamer's Take on Agentic AI Safety
2 points · Open discussionMake Trust Irrelevant: A Gamer's Take on Agentic AI Safety
I wrote a short position paper arguing that current agentic AI safety failures are the confused deputy problem on repeat. We are handing agents ambient authority and trying to contain it with soft constraints like prompts and userland wrappers. My take: you need hard, reduce-only authority enforced at a real boundary (kernel control plane class), not something bypassable from userland. Curious how others are modeling this. What constraints do you think are truly non-negotiable?
10 points · Open discussion