HackerReposA FIELD GUIDE TO OPEN SOURCE
ProSponsor the shelf♧ 0
← Back to top all-time
digama0
mm0
Lean2019–2026
digama0 / mm0

mm0

Metamath Zero specification language

7Distinct people
14Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
427GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Metamath Zero specification language

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 7:24:48 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year14 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2019-10-26 02:43:43 UTC to 2026-07-30 13:45:08 UTC.

0123452019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments20192020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20222023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC514

What Hacker News says

1 sources
> You can't feasibly host or verify proofs on-chain I came to the same conclusion with existing systems, full on-chain verification would not be economically feasible. But perhaps a special-purpose chain specifically made for this may not have the same limitations. Or Truebit-like oracle systems may be possible, where external verifiers can dispute other external verifier's assertions of correctness by running only the (potentially) wrong steps on-chain. The frontrunning may be avoided by submitting hash(accountid | secret large random number | proof) first, then once that's finalized the full proof with the random number. The random number so the proof can't be brute forced from the hash. Payouts have some reasonable delay so if someone tries to frontrun the second step by intercepting the full proof and submits both steps (possibly with
Read the rest
a varied proof) before the second step of the first person is finalized, the first person can still prove with a reference to their first step and their working proof that they were first. This still requires some thought regarding (forced) congestion in relation to the transaction cost and bounty size. Metamath has the same problem of the system accepting new axioms anywhere, and the same $a statement being used for definitions. I have some hopes for Metamath Zero (https://github.com/digama0/mm0), which is a related system which may be able to fix this. I think this idea is rather synergistic with proof agents. I think more people would consider developing these if enough bounties were credibly committed. It might speed up and greatly increase the number of formalized proofs.
In $10M AI Mathematical Olympiad Prize

MAKE YOURSELF AT HOME

A few shortcuts

/
Search the collection
?
Open this guide
Esc
Close dialogs and navigation

Your saved repositories and interests stay in this browser.