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docker-library
ruby
Shell2016–2023
docker-library / ruby

ruby

Docker Official Image packaging for Ruby

5Distinct people
6Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
628GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Docker Official Image packaging for Ruby

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 6:01:08 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year6 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-02-02 14:26:34 UTC to 2023-01-18 01:03:52 UTC.

0122016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20162017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20192020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2023

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

2 sources
I believe most of your questions have a (mostly) positive answer. Admittedly the Docker project moves fast, so I've tried to provide a link or two for each: > Are these signed with some sort of crypto and known-good keys, similar to package signing keys attached to a package repo, or are we taking Docker's word for it? The official images are all signed with Notary[0] (released <2 years ago). The "Content Trust" feature makes use of TLS plus a number of keys[1]. It can be enabled in required environments to prevent the pulling of non-signed images (`export DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1`). > I had to go 3 levels up from the link on the Docker Hub page to get to this one because most of the images are FROM:something. There is a helpful Chrome extension, OctoLinker[2], that makes the `FROM parent` clickable (among other non-Docker things). I'm sure
Read the rest
there are similar extensions, but this is the one I currently use. > a) still derived from some other upstream Dockerfile (must this file also be validated by Docker to qualify as an "official repo"?) The `FROM` line in the Dockerfile would likely be the first thing to undergo scrutiny, for obvious reasons. Also, all the layers go through security scanning[3], some issues can be fixed[4] and others are tracked upstream (e.g. by Debian in the case of the Ruby image you linked[5]). > you end up with an image that is very bloated due to the way Docker's caching layer functions You can now use `docker build --squash`[6] to combine multiple image layers while still benefiting from layer caching during builds. Also, the final image won't contain files that are added in previous layers and removed in later ones. (And with multi-stage builds recently merged, soon multiple inheritance will be easier.) > Is this "transparency" only the case on "official" images? As far as I can see Docker Hub just stores the pushed binary blob and not the Dockerfile required to build it I would say groups or sole developers that want others to use their images will usually provide documentation and links to the Dockerfiles. Of course, this isn't always possible or desired (e.g. see closed-source projects like Windows Server Core[7], or the countless people using Docker Hub as a free image host.) [0]: https://github.com/docker/notary [1]: https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/trust/trust_key_mng/ [2]: https://octolinker.github.io/ [3]: https://docs.docker.com/docker-hub/official_repos/#how-do-i-... [4]: https://github.com/docker-library/official-images/pulls?utf8... [5]: https://github.com/docker-library/ruby/issues/117 [6]: https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/build/#... [7]: https://hub.docker.com/r/microsoft/windowsservercore/
In Connecting Kubernetes services with linkerd
>I think the habit for most folks (and the best practice) is to use one of the "official" Ruby images. Ah, I didn't realize there was a blessed subset of repositories for which the Docker team has independently verified the identity. Are these signed with some sort of crypto and known-good keys, similar to package signing keys attached to a package repo, or are we taking Docker's word for it? Is there a way to filter to "official" repositories only, or tell Docker to only fetch from a whitelist of repositories (so that private ones can be included)? While it is nice that there are a few known-good repositories for projects popular enough to secure the approval of Docker Inc., the habit of casually importing images is still rampant, afaict. >Far from opaque, the official images are typically well-documented, and the source code is availabl
Read the rest
e from the various Git repositories linked to from the library. Well, here's an example [0] of a base Dockerfile. I had to go 3 levels up from the link on the Docker Hub page to get to this one because most of the images are FROM:something. After chasing the tree up, this is a) still derived from some other upstream Dockerfile (must this file also be validated by Docker to qualify as an "official repo"?) and b) a good example of the "brilliance" of the Dockerfile format. That massive set of line continuations is necessary because if you implement the Dockerfile "naively", by making each modification a "RUN" command, you end up with an image that is very bloated due to the way Docker's caching layer functions. Bonus feature: if any of those commands is to return a non-0 exit code, the line will abort. Is this "transparency" only the case on "official" images? As far as I can see Docker Hub just stores the pushed binary blob and not the Dockerfile required to build it, so if you're not picking your image base carefully, there may not be a way to verify its contents (short of introspecting the image). [0] https://github.com/docker-library/ruby/blob/752c5f7cf44870ce...
In Connecting Kubernetes services with linkerd

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