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Drive-Trust-Alliance
sedutil
C++2015–2023
Drive-Trust-Alliance / sedutil

sedutil

DTA sedutil Self encrypting drive software

6Distinct people
9Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
703GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

DTA sedutil Self encrypting drive software

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 2:19:09 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year9 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2015-12-01 18:16:12 UTC to 2023-01-27 14:49:44 UTC.

012342015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20152016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20192020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

1 sources
The article is saying that people don't unlock their devices before recycling them. This could be true, but as I mentioned in another comment, as soon as it's removed from the original users iCloud account that lock will be removed. > how can you trust that the "erase everything" works? You can't remove it, but as long as nobody else can use the device to recover data then it's fine. FWIW it's actually pretty easy with SATA SSD's to set a device key, which then encrypts everything on the drive at full speed: https://github.com/Drive-Trust-Alliance/sedutil The drives are actually already doing this, it's just that the key is set to 0's. I can imagine that, given the drive is accessed via T2, that Apples NANDS are being accessed the same way, in which case scrambling the key is enough to make it unrecoverable permanently.
In Apple’s Mac security is so good, it’s sending used M1 MacBooks to the scrap heap

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