eudi-doc-architecture-and-reference-framework

> the sponsor of Louisiana's HB-570, publicly confirmed that a Meta lobbyist brought the legislative language directly to her. The bill as drafted required only app stores (Apple, Google) to verify user ages. It did not require social media platforms to do anything. Thing is, when these “make the websites collect your ID” proposals come up, the overwhelming sentiment here is “this is terrible and we need to do it lower in the stack”. I think the OS is a better place than the website. (Let security conscious folks use a standalone device too if desired.) The astroturfing stuff is obviously sus, I don’t have a feel for whether this is egregious by the standards of $T companies or just par. Of course, the EU option of using proper ZK proofs etc sounds way better as portrayed in the OP. But when you actually dig in, doesn’t the EU effectively

EUDI has had various criticism with its approach for not supporting unlinkability (with the same attestation used across verifiers they can be traced to the same user). There are some long Github threads in the official repo along with a PDF[1] of cryptographer's feedback about the privacy issues. Also covered in this[2] article. This is unlike BBS+ which supports unlinkability and which was even recommended by GSMA Europe to such address downsides. In the Github discussions there seems to be pushback by those officially involved that claim BBS+ isn't compatible with EUDI[3] and there seems to be some plateauing of any progress advancing it. [1] https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-archi... [2] https://news.dyne.org/the-problems-of-european-digital-ident... [3] https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-archi