HackerReposA FIELD GUIDE TO OPEN SOURCE
ProSponsor the shelf♧ 0
← Back to top all-time
faramesh
faramesh-core
Go2026–2026
faramesh / faramesh-core

faramesh-core

Governance-as-Code for AI agents. Declarative constraints with deterministic enforcement. Provisioning Identity, Tool-based rules, Brokering Credentials & Ensuring safe deployment

2Distinct people
5Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
111GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Governance-as-Code for AI agents. Declarative constraints with deterministic enforcement. Provisioning Identity, Tool-based rules, Brokering Credentials & Ensuring safe deployment

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:56:07 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by week5 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2026-01-21 22:00:44 UTC to 2026-05-05 15:27:07 UTC. Weeks start Monday, UTC.

012342026-01-19 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-26 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 2 submissions, 2 commentsJan 192026-01-26 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-02 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-02 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-09 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-09 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsMar 92026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 commentsMay 4

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Jan 192026-01-19 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-26 00:00:00 UTC422
Jan 262026-01-26 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-02 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 22026-02-02 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-09 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 92026-02-09 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 162026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 232026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 22026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 92026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 162026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 232026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 302026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 62026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 132026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 202026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 272026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC000
May 42026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC110

What Hacker News says

5 sources
Spot on, Yaron. Schematic validation (Protobuf) catches structural errors, but semantic aliasing (the 'rm -rf' vs 'rm -r -f' problem) is exactly why I developed the CAR (Canonical Action Representation) spec. I actually published a 40-page paper (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18296731) that defines this exact 'Action Authorization Boundary.' It treats the LLM as an untrusted actor and enforces determinism at the execution gate. Faramesh Core is the reference implementation of that paper. I’d love for you to check out the 'Execution Gate Flow' section. it would be a massive win to see a Faramesh-Cordum bridge that brings this level of semantic security to your orchestrator. Code: https://github.com/faramesh/faramesh-core
In Ask HN: How are you handling non-probabilistic security for LLM agents?

Show HN: Faramesh – A deterministic gate for stochastic Autonomous AI agents

I spent the last few months watching LLM agents "vibe-code" their way into production disasters. We’ve been pretending that a 500-word system prompt is a security layer. It isn't. It's just a polite request that the model is one jailbreak away from ignoring. I built Faramesh because I wanted a hard, cryptographic boundary between the agent's "brain" and my actual infrastructure. It intercepts tool-calls and forces them through a deterministic gate before any code runs. If the action isn't in your policy, it simply doesn't exist. The biggest headache was canonicalization.py. LLMs are messy—one model sends a float as 1.0, another as 1.00, and it breaks the cryptographic hash every time. I wrote a normalization engine to ensure that identical intent produces the exact same byte-stream and hash. It’s open source (Python/Node SDKs). I’m curiou
Read the rest
s if people think this should live at the framework level or as a standalone proxy. Tear the code apart: https://github.com/faramesh/faramesh-core For theory lovers, I'd invite you to read a paper i published just recently titled "Faramesh: A Protocol-Agnostic Execution Control Plane for Autonomous Agent systems" (Link below) https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18296731
1 points · Open discussion
The problem with autonomous agents today isn't that they aren't "smart" enough; it’s that they are fundamentally stochastic, while our infrastructure (SQL, APIs, Shell) is deterministic. You are essentially giving a probabilistic model a direct line to your production environment and hoping "system prompts" act as security. As we found out in 2025, prompts are not a security layer. You cannot safely give a probabilistic model a "delete" key and hope the instructions hold. We built Faramesh to bridge this gap. It is the first formalized Action Authorization Boundary (AAB) for the agentic web—an open-source, protocol-agnostic execution gate designed to sit between an agent’s reasoning engine and the target system. In 2025, everyone focused on the "Brain" (the model). In 2026, the bottleneck is the "Nervous System" (execution control). The i
Read the rest
ndustry is shifting from Model-mania to Infrastructure-mania; we believe agents shouldn't be "trusted"—they should be governed. How it works: Unlike existing guardrail libraries that use more LLMs to "check" the first LLM (adding more stochasticity), Faramesh introduces a hard, cryptographic gate. It intercepts agent intent, canonicalizes it into a deterministic byte-stream, and validates it against a strict, logic-based policy engine before any code is executed. Key Technical Details: - Deterministic Canonicalization: We found that slight variations in JSON or float representation break audit trails. Faramesh handles lexicographical sorting and float normalization (e.g., ensuring 1.0 and 1.00 produce identical bytes) so that identical intent produces identical hashes. - The AAB Protocol: This defines what an agent is allowed to do across any medium. Whether targeting REST APIs, gRPC, or raw Shell, the control logic remains the same. - Zero Trust Execution: The agent never touches the target system directly. It sends a "Proposed Action" to the gate. If the engine is confused or a policy is missing, it fails closed and the action is blocked. - Cryptographic Hashing: Every authorized action is hashed, creating an immutable, replay-protected audit trail of agent intent. - SDK-First Integration: We’ve released SDKs for Python and Node.js to make this a drop-in layer for existing LangChain/AutoGen stacks. We’ve open-sourced the core engine and the SDKs. We’re particularly interested in feedback on our canonicalization logic and the policy engine’s performance overhead. Paper: https://zenodo.org/records/18296731 GitHub: https://github.com/faramesh/faramesh-core PyPI: pip install faramesh NPM: npm install @faramesh/sdk
In Faramesh – The first deterministic execution control plane for AI agents

MAKE YOURSELF AT HOME

A few shortcuts

/
Search the collection
?
Open this guide
Esc
Close dialogs and navigation

Your saved repositories and interests stay in this browser.