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FiloSottile
age
Go2019–2026
FiloSottile / age

age

A simple, modern and secure encryption tool (and Go library) with small explicit keys, no config options, and UNIX-style composability.

107Distinct people
126Mentions
1Explicit recommenders
24.3KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

A simple, modern and secure encryption tool (and Go library) with small explicit keys, no config options, and UNIX-style composability.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

I recommend age as well. It offers encrypting for recipients for whom you have public keys. https://github.com/FiloSottile/age

ChrisGranger used a recommendation phrase. One indexed comment matches. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 10:50:02 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year126 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2019-10-07 03:21:46 UTC to 2026-10-10 15:30:33 UTC.

01020302019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 11 mentions; 4 submissions, 7 comments20192020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 15 mentions; 0 submissions, 15 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 29 mentions; 7 submissions, 22 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 24 mentions; 5 submissions, 19 comments20222023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 12 mentions; 0 submissions, 12 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 12 mentions; 2 submissions, 10 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 16 mentions; 3 submissions, 13 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 2 submissions, 5 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC1147
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC15015
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC29722
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC24519
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC12012
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC12210
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC16313
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC725

From the project README

An excerpt from the repository, fetched Nov 13, 2026.

Read the project’s introduction
age is a simple, modern and secure file encryption tool, format, and Go library. It features small explicit keys, post-quantum support, no config options, and UNIX-style composability. $ age-keygen -o key.txt Public key: age1ql3z7hjy54pw3hyww5ayyfg7zqgvc7w3j2elw8zmrj2kg5sfn9aqmcac8p $ tar cvz ~/data | age -r age1ql3z7hjy54pw3hyww5ayyfg7zqgvc7w3j2elw8zmrj2kg5sfn9aqmcac8p > data.tar.gz.age $ age --decrypt -i key.txt data.tar.gz.age > data.tar.gz 📜 The format specification is at age-encryption.org/v1. age was designed by @benjojo and @FiloSottile. 🦀 An alternative interoperable Rust implementation is available at github.com/str4d/rage. 🌍 Typage is a TypeScript implementation. It works in the browser, Node.js, Deno, and Bun. 🔑 Hardware PIV tokens such as YubiKeys are supported through the age-plugin-yubikey plugin. ✨ For more plugins, implementations, tools, and integrations, check out the awesome age list. 💬 The author pronounces it [aɡe̞] with a hard g, like GIF, and it's always spelled lowercase. Installation Homebrew (macOS or Linux) brew install age MacPorts port install age Windows winget install --id FiloSottile.age Alpine Linux v3.15+ apk add age Arch Linux pacman -S age Debian 12+ (Bookworm) apt install age Debian 11 (Bullseye) apt install age/bullseye-backports (enable backports for age v1.0.0+) Fedora 33+ dnf install age Gentoo Linux emerge app-crypt/age Guix System guix package -i age NixOS / Nix nix-env -i age openSUSE Tumbleweed zypper install age Ubuntu 22.04+ apt install age Void Linux xbps-install age FreeBSD pkg install age (security/age) OpenBSD 6.7+ pkg_add age (security/age) Chocolatey (Windows) choco install age.portable Scoop (Windows) scoop bucket add extras && scoop install age On Windows, Linux, macOS, and FreeBSD you can use the pre-built binaries. https://dl.filippo.io/age/latest?for=linux/amd64 https://dl.filippo.io/age/v1.3.2?for=darwin/arm64 ... If you download the pre-built binaries, you can check their Sigsum proofs. If your system has a supported version of Go, you can build from source. go install filippo.io/age/cmd/...@latest Help from new packagers is very welcome. Usage For the full documentation, read the age(1) man page. Usage: age [--encrypt] (-r RECIPIENT | -R PATH)... [--armor] [-o OUTPUT] [INPUT] age [--encrypt] --passphrase [--armor] [-o OUTPUT] [INPUT] age --decrypt [-i PATH]... [-o OUTPUT] [INPUT] Options: -e, --encrypt Encrypt the input to the output. Default if omitted. -d, --decrypt Decrypt the input to the output. -o, --output OUTPUT Write the result to the file at path OUTPUT. -a, --armor Encrypt to a PEM encoded format. -p, --passphrase Encrypt with a passphrase. -r, --recipient RECIPIENT Encrypt to the specified RECIPIENT. Can be repeated. -R, --recipients-file PATH Encrypt to recipients listed at PATH. Can be repeated. -i, --identity PATH Use the identity file at PATH. Can be repeated. --version Print the version. INPUT defaults to standard input, and OUTPUT defaults to standard output. If OUTPUT exists, it will be overwritten. RECIPIENT can be an age public key generated by age-keygen ("age1...") or an SSH public key ("ssh-ed25519 AAAA...", "ssh-rsa AAAA..."). Recipient files contain one or more recipients, one per line. Empty lines and lines starting with "#" are ignored as comments. "-" may be used to read recipients from standard input. Identity files contain one or more secret keys ("AGE-SECRET-KEY-1..."), one per line, or an SSH key. Empty lines and lines starting with "#" are ignored as comments. Passphrase encrypted age files can be used as identity files. Multiple key files can be provided, and any unused ones will be ignored. "-" may be used to read identities from standard input. When --encrypt is specified explicitly, -i can also be used to encrypt to an identity file symmetrically, instead or in addition to normal recipients. Multiple recipients Files can be encrypted to multiple recipients by repeating -r/--recipient. Every recipient will be able to decrypt the file. $ age -o example.jpg.age -r age1ql3z7hjy54pw3hyww5ayyfg7zqgvc7w3j2elw8zmrj2kg5sfn9aqmcac8p \ -r age1lggyhqrw2nlhcxprm67z43rta597azn8gknawjehu9d9dl0jq3yqqvfafg example.jpg Recipient files Multiple recipients can also be listed one per line in one or more files passed with the -R/--recipients-file flag. $ cat recipients.txt # Alice age1ql3z7hjy54pw3hyww5ayyfg7zqgvc7w3j2elw8zmrj2kg5sfn9aqmcac8p # Bob age1lggyhqrw2nlhcxprm67z43rta597azn8gknawjehu9d9dl0jq3yqqvfafg $ age -R recipients.txt example.jpg > example.jpg.age If the argument to -R (or -i) is -, the file is read from standard input. Post-quantum keys To generate hybrid post-quantum keys, which are secure against future quantum computer attacks, use the -pq flag with age-keygen. This may become the default in the future. Post-quantum identities start with AGE-SECRET-KEY-PQ-1... and recipients with age1pq1.... The recipients are unfortunately ~2000 characters long. $ age-keygen -pq -o key.txt $ ag
Read the full README on GitHub

What Hacker News says

15 sources
Tink (https://github.com/google/tink) and Age (https://github.com/FiloSottile/age) are the obvious examples, although I think to some extent even things like the Signal Protocol apply. I'd call them both examples of applied cryptography research. I think these projects compare very, very closely to applied ML research: They come out of industry research labs, are worked on by respected experts, usually involving some academics, ultimately you end up with an artifact beyond just a paper that is useful for something and improves upon the status quo. I'm admittedly not a total expert, so I don't know how far down to the level of crypto "primitives" this kind of work goes, but I believe there is some effort to pick primitives that are difficult to "mess up" (think "bad primes") and I know tink actively prevents you from making bad choices in
Read the rest
the cases where you are forced to make a choice. Even more broadly, just consider any tptacek (who I should clarify is *not a researcher, lest he correct me) post on pgp/gpg email, or people like Matt Green (http://mattsmith.de/pdfs/DevelopersAreNotTheEnemy.pdf). Edit: Some poking around also brought up this person: https://yaseminacar.de/, who has some interesting papers on similar subjects.
In Yann LeCun quits Twitter amid acrimonious exchanges on AI bias
keybase is unfortunately one of those programs that combine many things into one - somewhat antithetical to the Unix philosophy of doing one thing well. For kbfs, tahoe-lafs is a nice alternative. I don't know about the fuse interface as I haven't used it, but it has some solid fundamentals behind it, actively being developed and can be self hosted. GPG still works! GPG also is a swiss army knife, unfortunately. There is OpenBSD signify (or minisign) if you want signatures. There is also age - https://github.com/FiloSottile/age
In Ask HN: Keybase Alternatives?
Yes. I _love_ Keybase Git for instant, immediate, safe backups of private repos. Keybase Git has been an absolutely killer feature for me since it came out and I'll miss it terribly if Keybase-the-software takes a turn for the worse. Now is the time to ensure I've got everything properly backed up, I guess. https://github.com/spwhitton/git-remote-gcrypt is probably the best alternative for now, but I'm wailing and gnashing my teeth at the prospect of going back to PGP keys. Maybe there's some way to intersect https://github.com/FiloSottile/age and a git remote.
In Ask HN: Keybase Alternatives?
> So what do you use for signing and encryption today when setting up a heterogeneous system like email or git? I don't. For Email, quoting the aforementioned post[0]... > Encrypting Email > Don’t. > Email is insecure. Even with PGP, it’s default-plaintext, which means that even if you do everything right, some totally reasonable person you mail, doing totally reasonable things, will invariably CC the quoted plaintext of your encrypted message to someone else (we don’t know a PGP email user who hasn’t seen this happen). PGP email is forward-insecure. Email metadata, including the subject (which is literally message content), are always plaintext. > This isn’t going to get fixed. To make actually-secure email, you’d have to tunnel another protocol over email (you’d still be conceding traffic analysis attacks). At that point, why bother pre
Read the rest
tending? > Encrypting email is asking for a calamity. Recommending email encryption to at-risk users is malpractice. Anyone who tells you it’s secure to communicate over PGP-encrypted email is putting their weird preferences ahead of your safety. For signing commits in git, I'll quote Filippo[1]'s 'Sigining git commits considered harmful'[2] rant on Twitter. > One of my issues with it is that it's marketed for a problem it does not solve (git metadata authentication and identity) and it's way suboptimal for the problem it solves (signed releases). > I don't believe it works for that. You need at least a rebase (and key rotation, and identity) story for that. > Pushes can be just as important as contents (imagine force pushing an old signed vulnerable tree to master) and are completely unprotected by this model. > In the security space I struggle to see the line between "doesn't do the job" and "harmful", but sure, I am willing to downgrade "considered harmful" to "doesn't make sense". If you still want to encrypt something plain text though, I would recommend age[3], which is: > A simple, modern and secure encryption tool with small explicit keys, no config options, and UNIX-style composability. [0]: https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html#... [1]: https://filippo.io [2]: https://twitter.com/filosottile/status/1248110291751231488 [3]: https://github.com/FiloSottile/age
In Re-Thinking Electronic Mail
Can you elaborate on the threat model a little bit? I'm struggling to understand how you can protect against this in a way where an attacker that both knows the relevant encryption key (whether public or secret, depending on whether the crypto is asymmetric) and has write access to the backup location. If you sign the backups with some distinct key of the backup server, why wouldn't the attacker have access to those keys too (in the above scenario they already have access to the keys that the backup server is using for encryption). I know there's an open issue in age for adding authentication[1], so there clearly is some threat this would protect against but I can't figure it out. [1]: https://github.com/FiloSottile/age/issues/59
In A backup rotation filter for the Unix shell

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