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FiloSottile
age
Go2019–2026
FiloSottile / age

age

A simple, modern and secure encryption tool (and Go library) with small explicit keys, no config options, and UNIX-style composability.

107Distinct people
126Mentions
1Explicit recommenders
24.3KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

A simple, modern and secure encryption tool (and Go library) with small explicit keys, no config options, and UNIX-style composability.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

I recommend age as well. It offers encrypting for recipients for whom you have public keys. https://github.com/FiloSottile/age

ChrisGranger used a recommendation phrase. One indexed comment matches. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 8:59:02 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year126 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2019-10-07 03:21:46 UTC to 2026-10-10 15:30:33 UTC.

01020302019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 11 mentions; 4 submissions, 7 comments20192020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 15 mentions; 0 submissions, 15 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 29 mentions; 7 submissions, 22 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 24 mentions; 5 submissions, 19 comments20222023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 12 mentions; 0 submissions, 12 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 12 mentions; 2 submissions, 10 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 16 mentions; 3 submissions, 13 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 2 submissions, 5 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC1147
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC15015
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC29722
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC24519
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC12012
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC12210
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC16313
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC725

From the project README

An excerpt from the repository, fetched Nov 13, 2026.

Read the project’s introduction
age is a simple, modern and secure file encryption tool, format, and Go library. It features small explicit keys, post-quantum support, no config options, and UNIX-style composability. $ age-keygen -o key.txt Public key: age1ql3z7hjy54pw3hyww5ayyfg7zqgvc7w3j2elw8zmrj2kg5sfn9aqmcac8p $ tar cvz ~/data | age -r age1ql3z7hjy54pw3hyww5ayyfg7zqgvc7w3j2elw8zmrj2kg5sfn9aqmcac8p > data.tar.gz.age $ age --decrypt -i key.txt data.tar.gz.age > data.tar.gz 📜 The format specification is at age-encryption.org/v1. age was designed by @benjojo and @FiloSottile. 🦀 An alternative interoperable Rust implementation is available at github.com/str4d/rage. 🌍 Typage is a TypeScript implementation. It works in the browser, Node.js, Deno, and Bun. 🔑 Hardware PIV tokens such as YubiKeys are supported through the age-plugin-yubikey plugin. ✨ For more plugins, implementations, tools, and integrations, check out the awesome age list. 💬 The author pronounces it [aɡe̞] with a hard g, like GIF, and it's always spelled lowercase. Installation Homebrew (macOS or Linux) brew install age MacPorts port install age Windows winget install --id FiloSottile.age Alpine Linux v3.15+ apk add age Arch Linux pacman -S age Debian 12+ (Bookworm) apt install age Debian 11 (Bullseye) apt install age/bullseye-backports (enable backports for age v1.0.0+) Fedora 33+ dnf install age Gentoo Linux emerge app-crypt/age Guix System guix package -i age NixOS / Nix nix-env -i age openSUSE Tumbleweed zypper install age Ubuntu 22.04+ apt install age Void Linux xbps-install age FreeBSD pkg install age (security/age) OpenBSD 6.7+ pkg_add age (security/age) Chocolatey (Windows) choco install age.portable Scoop (Windows) scoop bucket add extras && scoop install age On Windows, Linux, macOS, and FreeBSD you can use the pre-built binaries. https://dl.filippo.io/age/latest?for=linux/amd64 https://dl.filippo.io/age/v1.3.2?for=darwin/arm64 ... If you download the pre-built binaries, you can check their Sigsum proofs. If your system has a supported version of Go, you can build from source. go install filippo.io/age/cmd/...@latest Help from new packagers is very welcome. Usage For the full documentation, read the age(1) man page. Usage: age [--encrypt] (-r RECIPIENT | -R PATH)... [--armor] [-o OUTPUT] [INPUT] age [--encrypt] --passphrase [--armor] [-o OUTPUT] [INPUT] age --decrypt [-i PATH]... [-o OUTPUT] [INPUT] Options: -e, --encrypt Encrypt the input to the output. Default if omitted. -d, --decrypt Decrypt the input to the output. -o, --output OUTPUT Write the result to the file at path OUTPUT. -a, --armor Encrypt to a PEM encoded format. -p, --passphrase Encrypt with a passphrase. -r, --recipient RECIPIENT Encrypt to the specified RECIPIENT. Can be repeated. -R, --recipients-file PATH Encrypt to recipients listed at PATH. Can be repeated. -i, --identity PATH Use the identity file at PATH. Can be repeated. --version Print the version. INPUT defaults to standard input, and OUTPUT defaults to standard output. If OUTPUT exists, it will be overwritten. RECIPIENT can be an age public key generated by age-keygen ("age1...") or an SSH public key ("ssh-ed25519 AAAA...", "ssh-rsa AAAA..."). Recipient files contain one or more recipients, one per line. Empty lines and lines starting with "#" are ignored as comments. "-" may be used to read recipients from standard input. Identity files contain one or more secret keys ("AGE-SECRET-KEY-1..."), one per line, or an SSH key. Empty lines and lines starting with "#" are ignored as comments. Passphrase encrypted age files can be used as identity files. Multiple key files can be provided, and any unused ones will be ignored. "-" may be used to read identities from standard input. When --encrypt is specified explicitly, -i can also be used to encrypt to an identity file symmetrically, instead or in addition to normal recipients. Multiple recipients Files can be encrypted to multiple recipients by repeating -r/--recipient. Every recipient will be able to decrypt the file. $ age -o example.jpg.age -r age1ql3z7hjy54pw3hyww5ayyfg7zqgvc7w3j2elw8zmrj2kg5sfn9aqmcac8p \ -r age1lggyhqrw2nlhcxprm67z43rta597azn8gknawjehu9d9dl0jq3yqqvfafg example.jpg Recipient files Multiple recipients can also be listed one per line in one or more files passed with the -R/--recipients-file flag. $ cat recipients.txt # Alice age1ql3z7hjy54pw3hyww5ayyfg7zqgvc7w3j2elw8zmrj2kg5sfn9aqmcac8p # Bob age1lggyhqrw2nlhcxprm67z43rta597azn8gknawjehu9d9dl0jq3yqqvfafg $ age -R recipients.txt example.jpg > example.jpg.age If the argument to -R (or -i) is -, the file is read from standard input. Post-quantum keys To generate hybrid post-quantum keys, which are secure against future quantum computer attacks, use the -pq flag with age-keygen. This may become the default in the future. Post-quantum identities start with AGE-SECRET-KEY-PQ-1... and recipients with age1pq1.... The recipients are unfortunately ~2000 characters long. $ age-keygen -pq -o key.txt $ ag
Read the full README on GitHub

What Hacker News says

29 sources
As yepguy mentioned AGE is simpler. I can also mention few things: - It works smoothly with SSH keys (generated from ssh-keygen), which are perfectly recognized by possibly any developer. - No need for external client, such as GpgWin/Kleopatra for Windows. - Embed-able in Rust[0] and Go[1] (there are libraries), no need to call `gpg --decrypt ...` from the command line. - Encrypted files by pass and keys are smaller. I guess it is thanks to ecliptic-curve encryption. [0]: https://github.com/str4d/rage [1]: https://github.com/FiloSottile/age
In Clever uses of pass, the Unix password manager

Ask HN: Where to ask for feedback about a cryptography related tool

First of all I know that "implementing your own cryptography is bad". However, at some point, one does stumble upon a use-case that is not (well) covered by existing tools. Now, assuming one has already done his due-diligence and has read (and hopefully understood at least the main ideas of) cryptography related RFC's / papers / articles / posts / etc. (especially in the area pertaining to what one wants to build), and thus we can assume one is not a complete newbie in this mater, however, nor is he an expert. Basically we can assume he is an "amateur". Where would one go with his design to ask for feedback about it, in the hope to at least eliminate some weaknesses that one (as a non expert) might have overlooked. (I'm not speaking here about "proofs" or "audits".) ---- More specifically ---- but please let's not get into this right n
Read the rest
ow, this being just an example ---- I'm trying to implement something similar to `scrypt` (the encryption utility, that uses the `scrypt` PBKDF, <https://github.com/Tarsnap/scrypt>) or `age` (<https://github.com/FiloSottile/age>), as a replacement to my current solution that relies on GnuPG.
8 points · Open discussion
There's no consensus because there's no best answer. Here's an example of what you could do. Generate a new seed phrase on a hardware wallet. Encrypt the seed phrase using https://github.com/FiloSottile/age and print out the encrypted seed. Store the paper in a safety deposit box. Keep the hardware wallet at home in a safe. Write down the encryption key and the hardware PIN in an envelope to be opened in the event of your death. All that said, this particular example is vulnerable in that you could be held at gunpoint and lose everything. So next we start talking about cold wallets vs hot wallets...
In Hamilton teen embroiled in FBI probe, fingered in $46M cryptocurrency theft
This whole thread is off-topic (talking about AEAD in a post about signing), but: You can use age's AEAD encryption with Yubikeys. Yubikeys can do ECDHE in PIV mode. I wrote https://github.com/tv42/yubage as a subprocess plugin to https://github.com/str4d/rage (and hopefully https://github.com/FiloSottile/age once they think plugins are stable in enough to go in the reference implementation). The rage author also wrote their https://github.com/str4d/age-plugin-yubikey
In Sign arbitrary data with your SSH keys
You wrote: > This has literally nothing to do with age, which, by deliberate design, doesn't implement signing. What a strange and hostile thing to write. But of course I never claimed age performs signing I wrote that it re-uses SSH keys without a safety rationale. Here's what age actually says about its re-use of SSH keys: "As a convenience feature, age also supports encrypting to ssh-rsa and ssh-ed25519 SSH public keys, and decrypting with the respective private key file." -- https://github.com/FiloSottile/age#ssh-keys So, we see age does in fact re-use SSH keys for this unrelated purpose. And we see that, unlike the OpenSSH feature described in this article, it offers no rationale for why this is safe. Filippo talked about writing such a rationale but ultimately there isn't one provided. Ordinary users shouldn't try to imagine for the
Read the rest
mselves why something dangerous might be safe. In the absence of a rationale for why re-using your SSH private keys to decrypt age messages is OK, don't do it. The article provides a rationale for OpenSSH's "sign arbitrary data" feature (a briefer one is included in the OpenSSH distribution itself) so that you can assure yourself that this is a reasonable thing to do.
In Sign arbitrary data with your SSH keys
This is all without any kind of key management? No web of trust, no certificate authority/repository? Gpg is hardly perfect - but I'm not sure how useful public key signature and authenticated encryption modes are without key management? Are there any kind of embedded timestamp for signatures and encrypted files (signed at/valid to etc)? Ed: I gather the main focus of this project is to extend age with minisign - but I worry that what's really needed is a (new, not PGP) standard format - that allows authenticated encryption and signing - and possibly with date/validity for signatures (beyond merely an ad hoc use of minisign trusted comments - a standardized use of minisign comments might be fine?). At any rate, I'm not too thrilled about the age projects stand on signatures: https://github.com/FiloSottile/age/issues/51 I strongly believe
Read the rest
one of the main uses of encryption is enabling trust - and that implies trusted keys, trusted content and trusted signatures - along with a notion of time. They might be constructed out of primitives - but a user facing cli/gui should probably be strongly opinionated, and have good training wheels to make misuse and misunderstanding as difficult as possible..
In Show HN: Kryptor – A simple, modern, and secure encryption tool

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