firecracker

We've only verified EC2 during our research, but you do make a good point here. Nitro wasn't vulnerable. Firecracker might have been, considering that it is also built on top of KVM. Firecracker was not specifically designed to also defend against hardware vulnerabilities [1], so I don't see an immediate reason why it wouldn't have worked. We had to limit the scope of the project somewhere unfortunately, but it would have been nice to check Firecracker and Lambda as well. [1] https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/blob/main...

From https://e2b.dev/blog/firecracker-vs-qemu > AWS built [Firecracker (which is built on KVM)] to power Lambda and Fargate [2], where they need to quickly spin up isolated environments for running customer code. Companies like E2B use Firecracker to run AI generated code securily in the cloud, while Fly.io uses it to run lightweight container-like VMs at the edge [4, 5]. "We replaced Firecracker with QEMU" (2023) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36666782 "Firecracker's Kernel Support Policy" describes compatible kernel configurations; https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/blob/main... /? wasi microvm kernel [github] https://www.google.com/search?q=wasi+microvm+kernel+GitHub : - "Mewz: Lightweight Execution Environment for WebAssembly with High Isolation and Portability using Unikernels" (2024) https://arxiv.org/abs/241

Yes, that's right. The Firecracker team has written a fantastic doc about this as well: https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/blob/main.... It's important to refresh entropy immediately after clone. Still, there can be code that didn't assume it could be cloned (even though there's always been `fork`, of course). Because of this, we don't live clone across workspaces for unlisted/private sandboxes and limit the use case to dev envs where no secrets are stored.

Not a rust zealot, but https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/main... comes to mind.