HackerReposA FIELD GUIDE TO OPEN SOURCE
ProSponsor the shelf♧ 0
← Back to top all-time
FootprintAI
Containarium
Go2026–2026
FootprintAI / Containarium

Containarium

Open-source agent runtime — SSH-native isolation, eBPF egress policy, Kubernetes + LXC backends, GPU passthrough, MCP-native CLI

2Distinct people
9Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
318GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Open-source agent runtime — SSH-native isolation, eBPF egress policy, Kubernetes + LXC backends, GPU passthrough, MCP-native CLI

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 5:04:57 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by week9 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2026-01-10 14:42:02 UTC to 2026-07-14 08:54:39 UTC. Weeks start Monday, UTC.

01232026-01-05 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-12 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 commentsJan 52026-01-12 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-19 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-19 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-26 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-26 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-02 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-02 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-09 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-09 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsApr 62026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-18 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-18 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-25 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-25 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-08 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-08 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-15 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-15 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-22 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-22 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-29 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-29 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-06 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-07-06 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-13 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-07-13 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-20 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 commentsJul 13

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Jan 52026-01-05 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-12 00:00:00 UTC211
Jan 122026-01-12 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-19 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 192026-01-19 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-26 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 262026-01-26 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-02 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 22026-02-02 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-09 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 92026-02-09 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 162026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 232026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 22026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 92026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC110
Mar 162026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC101
Mar 232026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 302026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 62026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 132026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 202026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 272026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC110
May 42026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC000
May 112026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-18 00:00:00 UTC110
May 182026-05-18 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-25 00:00:00 UTC000
May 252026-05-25 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 12026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-08 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 82026-06-08 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-15 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 152026-06-15 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-22 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 222026-06-22 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-29 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 292026-06-29 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-06 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 62026-07-06 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-13 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 132026-07-13 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-20 00:00:00 UTC303

What Hacker News says

9 sources
Really cool project. It's fascinating to see more developers pushing back against the complexity of modern container orchestrators. This open-sourced project called Containarium (https://github.com/FootprintAI/Containarium) recently did with a very similar philosophy: keeping container environments lightweight, simple, and highly portable. also support MCP and eBPF for convience and security too.
In Show HN: Clawk – Give coding agents a disposable Linux VM, not your laptop
hsin003·Mar 15, 2026Submission

AI coding agents accidentally introduced vulnerable dependencies

Recently we discovered something unexpected on one of our servers: a cryptominer running in the background. The machine was hosting a web service built using Next.js. The first sign of trouble was unusually high CPU usage. Even during low traffic periods, the server was consistently running near 100% utilization. After inspecting running processes and network activity, we found a background process downloading and executing a mining binary. ROOT CAUSE The entry point was CVE-2025-29927, a vulnerability in Next.js that allows middleware protections to be bypassed. This enabled an attacker to reach internal endpoints that were assumed to be protected. Once they hit the exposed endpoint, they executed a script that pulled down the miner. HOW "VIBE CODING" FAILED US This application was largely generated using AI-assisted tools (Claude Code a
Read the rest
nd OpenAI Codex). This workflow—often called "vibe coding"—involved describing the desired functionality and letting the AI assemble the codebase. The project worked perfectly, but the AI pinned a vulnerable dependency version in the package.json. Because the app ran normally and passed functional tests, we missed the audit step. Automated scanners found the vulnerability within hours. THE BROADER LESSON AI increases development speed, but it also increases the "security debt" of every deployment. In traditional development, you review versions carefully. With AI-generated scaffolding, that step is easy to overlook. The attack chain: AI-generated project -> Vulnerable dependency -> Middleware bypass -> Automated scan -> Cryptominer HOW WE FIXED IT We realized that if we are using AI to speed up development, we need automated "brakes" to match that speed. We moved our apps onto Containarium ( https://github.com/FootprintAI/Containarium ), an open-source platform that uses ZFS-backed, unprivileged LXC containers to consolidate 100+ isolated environments onto a single VM with integrated security monitoring and vulnerability scanning. This ensures that even if a developer accidentally deploys a vulnerable dependency, the breach is isolated from the host and flagged by runtime monitoring. OPEN QUESTION I’m curious how others are handling the "AI audit" problem. Are you adding automated security gates to your dev environments, or are you strictly relying on traditional dependency scanning and hoping the "vibe" doesn't miss anything?
7 points · Open discussion
Hi HN, We’ve been experimenting with an alternative to the “one VM per developer” model for SSH-based development environments. The project is called Containarium: https://github.com/FootprintAI/Containarium The idea is simple: - One cloud VM - Many unprivileged LXC system containers - Each user gets their own isolated Linux environment via SSH (ProxyJump) - Persistent storage survives VM restarts This is NOT Kubernetes, Docker app containers, or a web IDE. Each container behaves like a lightweight VM (full OS, users, SSH access). Why we built it: We kept seeing teams pay for dozens of mostly-idle VMs just to give people a place to SSH into. Using LXC, we can host tens or hundreds of environments on a single VM and cut infra costs significantly. What we’re looking for: - Feedback from people who’ve run multi-tenant Linux systems at scale
Read the rest
- Security concerns we might be underestimating - Where this approach breaks down in real-world usage - Alternatives we should be considering (LXD, Proxmox, something else?) Tradeoffs we’re aware of: - Shared kernel (not VM-level isolation) - Not suitable for untrusted workloads - Linux-only - Requires infra discipline (limits, monitoring, backups) This is early-stage and open source. APIs and workflows will evolve. We’re not trying to “replace Kubernetes” — just trying to do one thing well: cheap, fast, SSH-based dev environments. Would love blunt feedback from folks who’ve been down this road before.
In Show HN: Hosting 100 Linux dev environments on one VM using LXC

MAKE YOURSELF AT HOME

A few shortcuts

/
Search the collection
?
Open this guide
Esc
Close dialogs and navigation

Your saved repositories and interests stay in this browser.