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freedomofpress
webcat
TypeScript2025–2025
freedomofpress / webcat

webcat

WEBCAT is an architectural framework for providing blocking code signing and verification, integrity and transparency checks for browser-based applications.

2Distinct people
2Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
113GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

WEBCAT is an architectural framework for providing blocking code signing and verification, integrity and transparency checks for browser-based applications.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:56:07 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by day2 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2025-03-28 05:28:49 UTC to 2025-04-06 20:06:41 UTC.

012025-03-28 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-03-29 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsMar 282025-03-29 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-03-30 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-03-30 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-03-31 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-03-31 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-02 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsApr 12025-04-02 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-03 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-04-03 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-04 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-04-04 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-05 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-04-05 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-06 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-04-06 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-04-07 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsApr 6

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Mar 282025-03-28 00:00:00 UTC2025-03-29 00:00:00 UTC101
Mar 292025-03-29 00:00:00 UTC2025-03-30 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 302025-03-30 00:00:00 UTC2025-03-31 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 312025-03-31 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 12025-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-02 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 22025-04-02 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-03 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 32025-04-03 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-04 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 42025-04-04 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-05 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 52025-04-05 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-06 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 62025-04-06 00:00:00 UTC2025-04-07 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

2 sources
I think one of the growing threats lately in the community has been over malicious client-side javascript, especially when the client handles end-to-end encrypted content (used on sites like Proton, MEGA etc.), so requiring users to trust Google with the contents of these client pages, and by extension the emails themselves, seems (in my opinion) to defeat the entire point of this feature. Some work in this area has been done in the form of browser extensions that are used to verify signed assets delivered to the client: https://github.com/freedomofpress/webcat https://github.com/tasn/webext-signed-pages https://github.com/jahed/webverify https://github.com/facebookincubator/meta-code-verify But unfortunately for now, none of these are seeing wide adoption and this remains an unsolved issue. It also does not require anyone to use known-go
Read the rest
od, audited and verified open-source components, meaning even if the client code is signed, it can still be malicious... there must be a greater reason to trust the code than just "trust me bro".
In Gmail E2E is as terrible as expected
Possibly https://github.com/freedomofpress/webcat? (I also made one, a long time ago: https://github.com/twiss/hcs-checker-firefox.) There is also an effort to build this into browsers directly, which we (Proton) are involved with: https://github.com/twiss/source-code-transparency (old initial proposal) https://github.com/beurdouche/explainers/blob/main/waict-exp... (more recent proposal) https://github.com/beurdouche/w3c-waict/blob/main/waict.bs (very early draft specification)
In Web-based cryptography is always snake oil

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