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Gerharddc
Litterbox
Rust2025–2026
Gerharddc / Litterbox

Litterbox

Somewhat Isolated Development Environments

4Distinct people
10Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
162GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

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What it is

Somewhat Isolated Development Environments

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

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This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 6:59:22 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month10 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2025-11-27 11:44:30 UTC to 2026-08-10 10:02:45 UTC.

01232025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 2 submissions, 0 commentsNov 20252025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsMar 20262026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsAug 2026

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Nov 20252025-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC220
Dec 20252025-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20262026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC303
Feb 20262026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Mar 20262026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20262026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC101
May 20262026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC110
Jun 20262026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20262026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20262026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

3 sources
Great writeup! An alternative I have explored (more for defense against supply-chain attacks than for agents admittedly) is to use rootless Podman to get a dev-container-like experience alongside sandboxing. To this end I have built https://github.com/Gerharddc/litterbox (https://litterbox.work/) which greatly simplifies container setup and integrates a special ssh-agent for sandboxing that always prompts the user before signing requests (as to keep your SSH keys safe). Unfortunately Litterbox won't currently help much for specifically protecting .env files in a project folder though. I'd need to think if the design can be extended for this use-case now that I'm aware of the issue.
In Bubblewrap: A nimble way to prevent agents from accessing your .env files
Very interesting read, I had no idea agents already had so much sandboxing built in! It does seem like this is probably not enough though. A few months ago I built https://github.com/Gerharddc/litterbox (https://litterbox.work/) primarily to shield my home directory from supply-chain attacks, but I imagine it could be very useful for defending against rogue agents too. Essentially it is a dev-container-like system for Linux built on rootless Podman with a strong focus on isolation and security. A key difference to normal dev-containers is that it encourages placing your entire dev environment (i.e. also the editor etc.) inside the container so that you are even protected from exploits in editor extensions for instance. This also makes it safer to allow agents (or built tools) to for instance install packages on your system since this is n
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ot the "real" system, it is only a container. Another important feature I added to Litterbox (and one I have not seen before) is a custom SSH agent which always prompts the user to confirm a signing operation through a pop-up. This means that things inside a Litterbox do not have unrestricted access to your normal SSH agent (something which could provide rogue actors access to your Github for instance).
In A deep dive on agent sandboxes
Very cool! I've recently built something similar at https://github.com/Gerharddc/litterbox (https://litterbox.work/). Litterbox only works on Linux as it heavily relies on Podman, but it does have a few other benefits for my use-case: - Most importantly, it exposes a Wayland socket so that I can run my entire dev environment (i.e. editor etc.) inside the container. This gives additional protection against exploits inside editor extensions for instance. - It also provides a special SSH agent which always prompts the user to confirm a signing operation. This means that an agent or an exploit never gets unsupervised access to your Github for instance. - It has some additional functions to help with enabling permissions inside the container which are only needed for certain use cases (such as allowing for TUN/TAP device creation). - It has no
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t been added yet, but I'm working on SELinux integration for even more secure isolation from the host.
In Show HN: Yolobox – Run AI coding agents with full sudo without nuking home dir

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