markdown

Particularly for [1], I strongly agree with you. This is so frustrating. The claimed CWE-125 [2] has a description that says "The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer." -- which empirically does not happen in the Go Markdown parser issue. It panics, sure, but that doesn't result in any reads past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. Said another way, *there is no out-of-bounds read* happening here at all. These kinds of false-positive CVE claims are super destructive to the credibility of the CVE system in general. -- [1] https://github.com/gomarkdown/markdown/security/advisories/G... [2] https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html

A lot of these "security bugs" are not really "security bugs" in the first place. Denial of service is not resulting in people's bank accounts being emptied or nude selfies being spread all over the internet. Things like "panics on certain content" like [1] or [2] are "security bugs" now. By that standard anything that fixes a potential panic is a "security bug". I've probably fixed hundreds if not thousands of "security bugs" in my career by that standard. Barely qualifies as a "security bug" yet it's rated as "6.2 Moderate" and "7.5 HIGH". To say nothing of gazillion "high severity" "regular expression DoS" nonsense and whatnot. And the worst part is all of this makes it so much harder to find actual high-severity issues. It's not harmless spam. [1]: https://github.com/gomarkdown/markdown/security/advisories/G... [2]: https://rustsec.or

Port https://github.com/commonmark/cmark from C to Go. Go has decent markdown parsers (I maintain one at https://github.com/gomarkdown/markdown/) but there is no parser that does CommonMark. That would be a valuable addition to Go ecosystem and the project is well scoped (and there is existing test suite so you'll know if the code works or not).