asylo

Asylo is not tied to EPID; the framework aims to abstract away any unique behavior specific to TEE implementations, and provide a common backend interface that developers can code against. The goal is to allow developers to easily migrate their apps between backends with little to no source-code changes. Specifically for attestation purposes, Asylo defines the EnclaveAssertionGenerator[1] and EnclaveAssertionVerifier[2] interfaces; these will need technology-specific implementations. In this initial release we only support a simulated backend, for experimental development. We'll continue looking into specific TEE technologies going forward. [1] https://github.com/google/asylo/blob/master/asylo/identity/e... [2] https://github.com/google/asylo/blob/master/asylo/identity/e...

Disclaimer: I am from the Asylo team. That’s exactly the level of abstraction that we’re looking to provide in Asylo. The parent post linked to the asylo/identity/sgx directory, which contains SGX-specific implementations of some of our higher-level identity abstractions [1]. For instance, “EnclaveAssertionGenerator” defines an interface for generating attestations bound to an enclave’s identity, and “sgx::LocalAssertionGenerator” (an internal construct to our framework) provides that functionality for SGX. [1] https://github.com/google/asylo/tree/master/asylo/identity

"Confidential computing" might seem to refer to homomorphic encryption, but has nothing to do with it in its usage here. After searching around a bit, I suspect that Microsoft Azure first used it in 2017 to refer to code running within a trusted enclave. It looks to me that while Asylo is agnostic about the specific TEE used, it is primarily targeted at Intel SGX [1]. Instead of having to trust Google to run your code correctly and not read your data, you'd have to trust Intel to manufacture a secure enclave and essentially bake in a private key that cannot be read. You could use the public key to encrypt your code and workload, and it would run in a part of the processor that Google presumably cannot access (or measure [2]). A good further introduction might be this paper [3] (especially the diagram on page 2), or this answer [4]. I'll r