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end-to-end
JavaScript2014–2022
google / end-to-end · Archived

end-to-end

End-To-End is a crypto library to encrypt, decrypt, digital sign, and verify signed messages (implementing OpenPGP)

38Distinct people
44Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
4.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

End-To-End is a crypto library to encrypt, decrypt, digital sign, and verify signed messages (implementing OpenPGP)

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 5:03:38 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year44 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2014-12-16 22:09:22 UTC to 2022-02-20 05:01:00 UTC.

051015202014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 2 submissions, 1 comments20142015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 20 mentions; 2 submissions, 18 comments2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 13 mentions; 3 submissions, 10 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 0 submissions, 5 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20182019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2022

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20142014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC321
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC20218
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC13310
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC505
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110

From the project README

An excerpt from the repository, fetched Nov 13, 2026.

Read the project’s introduction
End-To-End End-To-End is a crypto library to encrypt, decrypt, digital sign, and verify signed messages (implementing OpenPGP and OTR). This is the source code for the End-To-End library. It's built upon a newly developed, JavaScript-based crypto library. End-To-End implements the OpenPGP standard, IETF RFC 4880, enabling key generation, encryption, decryption, digital signature, and signature verification. We're releasing this library to enable community review. For more background, please see our blog post. Documentation for the project is stored in our Wiki. If you're planning to contribute to the project, check out our Contributor guide. A few projects have been built on top of this library, to list a few: E2EMail - A Gmail client that exchanges OpenPGP mail. Freedom JS - A framework for building peer-to-peer (P2P) web apps. uProxy - A browser extension that lets users share their internet connection. Google End-to-End Extension - Google End-to-End Chrome Extension (not ready for general use). Yahoo End-to-End Extension - A fork of Google's End-to-End for Yahoo mail.
Read the full README on GitHub

What Hacker News says

13 sources
The same can be said about a "trusted" OS like say Qubes OS, with untrusted hardware, like Intel's. Actually, that's what the developers of Qubes OS and other "free" operating systems have said as well. http://blog.invisiblethings.org/2015/10/27/x86_harmful.html https://www.fsf.org/blogs/licensing/intel-me-and-why-we-shou... If anything, I'm more frustrated with the Signal team that the app doesn't have as good call quality/performance as WhatsApp, nor does it have video call support, and that the Chrome desktop "app" doesn't seem to import my phone contacts for some reason - all of which is making me continue to mostly use less secure and less trusted alternatives. My point is we should aim for getting things "more secure" constantly, and I think we have in the past few years. So rather than just say "what's the point?", we should say "l
Read the rest
et's put more pressure on X company to open source/prove their system is secure" and hope that in time enough pressure is built that those companies actually agree to do those things. And since I was talking about putting pressure on companies, let me start: Where the hell is Google's End-to-End tool? It hasn't had any commits in over half an year, and we already know NSA's bestie, Yahoo, has given up on it. Should we start drawing some conclusions about the Google/NSA relationship, too? Did Google abandon the project? https://github.com/google/end-to-end There - who's next?
In A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal Messaging Protocol
To be honest, like all very large organisations, I suspect there are many different points of view within Google. For example, Google is slowly working on End-to-End [1]. People tend to expect that businesses run to the lowest common denominator: if it is profitable, then they will do it. This is demonstrably false, though. Most companies avoid the most egregious crimes in our society, and others actually take moral stands on various issues (Lush comes to mind [2]). But of course, no matter what, it's always going to be a nuanced issue (see the comments in the second link to see some people's negative reactions). Somewhat like Lush, Google has potential to improve the situation and position itself as "the least bad" option. The reality of the situation is that while privacy is very important, almost nobody wants to be completely priv
Read the rest
ate. They want to advertise things about themselves -- even to the whole world (see Facebook). Possibly they even want to lie about themselves, but this is still compatible with selling them things to help them sustain their fantasy. From the perspective of targeting ads, it seems to me to be much more effective to target the "public persona" that people wish others to see rather than the true private person. Building better tools that allow someone to say, "This is how I wish the world to see me" is much, much better than trolling through their personal information and patching up a profile that nobody wishes to expose. And for the few people who wish to be an informational black hole? You weren't going to sell them anything anyway. P.S. I understand that Google and others have a very long way to go to make this kind of thing a reality. It's just that I don't see it as being antithetical to their business goals. [1] - https://github.com/google/end-to-end [2] - https://uk.lush.com/article/lush-ethical-company
In Vint Cerf: Introducing the People-Centered Internet Newsletter
> should support efficient client-side encryption and signing. Did Google release "End to End" yet? https://github.com/google/end-to-end What's current best practice for people using gmail who want client side encryption? Google understandably comply with narrowly defined validly formed legal requests. https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/l... > What does Google do when it receives a legal request for user data? > Respect for the privacy and security of data you store with Google underpins our approach to producing data in response to legal requests. When we receive such a request, our team reviews the request to make sure it satisfies legal requirements and Google's policies. Generally speaking, for us to produce any data, the request must be made in writing, signed by an authorized official of the requesting agency
Read the rest
and issued under an appropriate law. If we believe a request is overly broad, we'll seek to narrow it. There are rare narrowly defined circumstances when Google will voluntarily hand over data without those legal checks: > Sometimes we voluntarily disclose user information to government agencies when we believe that doing so is necessary to prevent death or serious physical harm to someone. The law allows us to make these exceptions, such as in cases involving kidnapping or bomb threats. Emergency requests must contain a description of the emergency and an explanation of how the information requested might prevent the harm. Any information we provide in response to the request is limited to what we believe would help prevent the harm. Here are the numbers for US and UK. https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/c... A B C United Kingdom 3,146 75% 6,056 United States 12,002 78% 31,343 A = User data requests B = Percentage of requests where some data produced C = Users/Accounts specified
In NSA-proof your e-mail in 2 hours (2013)

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