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osv.dev
Go2021–2026
google / osv.dev

osv.dev

Open source vulnerability DB and triage service.

2Distinct people
10Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
3.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Open source vulnerability DB and triage service.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 1:57:11 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year10 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2021-08-04 13:22:36 UTC to 2026-10-19 22:26:49 UTC.

012342021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20232024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

4 sources
Looks like I'm a little bit late to this article about mailing list discussion about adding ~CVE search to pip. The broader trend here is to identify the names, versions, and hashes of all software installed packages in all languages and present an SBOM [1][2]. Does/would `pip audit` also lookup CVE vulns for extension modules written in other programming languages like C, Go, and Rust; or do existing tools that also already lookup vulns for Python packages [1] https://westurner.github.io/hnlog/ ; Ctrl-F "SBOM" [2] "Existing artifact vuln scanners, databases, and specs?" https://github.com/google/osv.dev/issues/55#issue-802542447 FWIW, from the OSV README https://github.com/google/osv.dev: > This is an ongoing project. We encourage open source ecosystems to adopt the OpenSSF Vulnerability format to enable open source users to easily aggre
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gate and consume vulnerabilities across all ecosystesm. See our blog post for more details. > The following ecosystems have vulnerabilities encoded in this format: > GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), PyPI Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0), Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0), Rust Advisory Database (CC0 1.0), Global Security Database (CC0 1.0) OSS-Fuzz (CC-BY 4.0) > Together, these include vulnerabilities from: > npm, Maven, Go, NuGet, PyPI, RubyGems, crates.io, Packagist, Linux, OSS-Fuzz
In Adding Auditing to Pip
FWIW, here's how OSV affords search queries: https://github.com/google/osv#data-dumps > For convenience, these sources are aggregated and continuously exported to a GCS bucket maintained by OSV: gs://osv-vulnerabilities > This bucket contains individual entries of the format gs://osv-vulnerabilities/<ECOSYSTEM>/<ID>.json as well as a zip containing all vulnerabilities for each ecosystem at gs://osv-vulnerabilities/<ECOSYSTEM>/all.zip > E.g. for PyPI vulnerabilities: # Or download over HTTP via https://osv-vulnerabilities.storage.googleapis.com/PyPI/all.zip gsutil cp gs://osv-vulnerabilities/PyPI/all.zip Hopefully, with an incentivized Blockchain Indexing service and/or e.g. GCS buckets that you just always `cp` and then load locally and then query locally, we can find a solution for queries of the growing CT Certificate Transparenc
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y logs.
In Google's Certificate Transparency Search page to be discontinued May 15th, 2022
Here's caddy's go/tls wrapper with e.g. ACME, OCSP stapling: https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/blob/master/modules/cad... Django-ca also does OCSP and certbot-compatible ACMEv2 w/ known limitations: https://django-ca.readthedocs.io/en/latest/acme.html#known-l... E.g. https://google.github.io/clusterfuzzlite/ is likely not so great at protocols because that requires testing concurrent and distributed systems and TLAplus, which at least currently can't find side channels FWIU. https://github.com/secfigo/Awesome-Fuzzing#network-protocol-... OSS-Fuzz runs CloudFuzz[Lite?] for many open source repos and feeds OSV OpenSSF Vulnerability Format: https://github.com/google/osv#current-data-sources
In Implementing a toy version of TLS 1.3
"Signing Images with Docker Content Trust" explains how cryptographic container image signatures work w/ Docker Notary (TUF) https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/trust/#signing-image... The TUF spec (and PyPI TUF PEPs) explains why a tar over https (with optional DNSSEC, a CA cert bundle, CRL, OCSP,) isn't sufficient for secure software distribution. "#ZeroTrust DevOps"; #DevSecOps What's the favorite package format with content signatures, key distribution, a keyring of trusted (authorized) keys, and a cryptographically-signed manifest of per-file hashes, permissions, and extended file attributes? FWIW, ZIP at least does a CRC32. We now have the Linux Foundation CNCF sigstore for any artifact, including OCI container images. W3C ld-proofs is a newer web standard that unfortunately all package managers haven't yet migrated to. https:/
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/news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29355786 Because ld-proofs is RDF, it works in JSON-LD and you could merge the entire SBOM [1] and e.g. CodeMeta [2] Linked Data metadata for all of the standardized-metadata-documented components in a stack. [1] https://github.com/google/osv/issues/55 [2] https://github.com/codemeta/codemeta
In Podman can transfer container images without a registry

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