paranoid_crypto

> eMudhra. you know, the company who had their CA private key as the number Four. this wasn't found by an ai, but just a human using a old ass library made by google called paranoid_crypto to scan through keys for fun out of curiosity https://github.com/google/paranoid_crypto > The goal is to increase the confidence in cryptography use cases inside and outside Google. With Paranoid, any cryptographic artifact can be tested, but its primary motivation is to detect the usage of weak third party hardware or software black boxes. So google didn't use their own paranoid_crypto lib to check the key before adding it to the Chrome trusted certs.

The researcher in question has publicly stated[0] that he wanted to try Google's paranoid_crypto tool[1], so he ran it on some roots as a quick proof-of-concept, and the first thing that happened was that it detected these intermediates. He also states he's been running a lot of certificate linters so this was just the next logical step I guess. [0]: https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-polic... [1]: https://github.com/google/paranoid_crypto

I'm guessing this is the code: https://github.com/google/paranoid_crypto/blob/main/paranoid...

> https://github.com/google/paranoid_crypto This repository was archived by the owner on Aug 19, 2026. It is now read-only. I guess now that we've checked, nobody will ever make a mistake like this again so we don't need this anymore? :)

new email from wayne, who is the original reporter: "I've had more than a few emails asking on how this was discovered. The simple answer is: https://github.com/google/paranoid_crypto Yeah, out of the box. CCADB was intended to be a quick corpus test before looking at subscriber certificates... I've done a far more thorough check of all existing CCADB certificates, thankfully no more hits. Most of my time has been spent going over the basics that everyone assumed someone else had already done - a critical mistake to ever make near security. So unless someone has significantly more computational resources or access to more cryptanalysis research the low-hanging fruit has been caught so far." https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-polic...

Randomness test > Specific tests for randomness: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Randomness_test Which NIST SP-800-22 implementation instead of the now-archived paranoid_crypto randomness tests? paranoid_crypto/docs/randomness_tests.md : https://github.com/google/paranoid_crypto/blob/main/docs/ran... /? NIST SP-800-22 Rust: https://www.google.com/search?q=NIST+SP-800-22+rust&oq=NIST+... Sometimes it's possible to whiten random to make it uniform random or normal random; Whitening transformation: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whitening_transformation