sandboxed-api

In case you're using CMake instead, you may want to take a look at the `hello_sapi` example (https://github.com/google/sandboxed-api/blob/main/sandboxed_...). Other build systems will be significantly harder to integrate with.

Hi, one of the project's co-authors here (SAPI that is). The aim of SAPI is a bit different than whole-process sandboxing. It's about retaining the original running speed (and lack of sandboxing constraints) of the main project part, while making sure that only some parts are isolated (sandboxed), and the programming interfaces to the sandboxed parts still look familiar. I'm not that well-versed into how WASM works when it tries to integrate with the rest of OS. But I'd assume it's some form of whole-process sandboxing, where practically all code is WASMized, and only some kind of loaders and trusted stubs are written in native assemblers (something has to invoke syscalls in the end). In this case one can use Sandbox2, which is part of SAPI, though not very prominently exposed - https://github.com/google/sandboxed-api/tree/main/sandboxed_

Here is an example for sandboxing zlib: https://github.com/google/sandboxed-api/blob/main/sandboxed_... So it adds extra state, that needs to be initialized, adds extra failure points than needed to be handled in the code (sandbox initialization can fail, the RPC layer can fail itself), need to wrap some data structures so they can be passed through (you can't just pass pointers as-is). I wonder how callbacks can be passed, but maybe that's actually less problematic than data pointers.

> Vulnerabilities always seem to be related to CGI scripts somehow. To the contrary, CGIs, running separate per-request processes, are one of the few mainstream mechanisms to create per-request isolates transparent to the host's security infrastructure and process monitoring. You have to go to great lengths to achieve similar isolation if you're starting with eg. FCGI-like multithreaded or evented dispatch in a single process [1]. Perhaps you've get that impression because of the wild west shared hosting scene (made possible by CGIs and isolation in the first place) eg. popular PHP-based packages WordPress, Drupal, Joomla, etc. Then I'm with you - the security record of these plugin monstrosities is truly in a league of it's own. Just so we're on the same page, the most recent WP wtf involves theme developers DDOSing their competitors (wh

I got more sense out of it on github: https://github.com/google/sandboxed-api/blob/master/README.m...