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google
sanitizers
C2016–2025
google / sanitizers

sanitizers

AddressSanitizer, ThreadSanitizer, MemorySanitizer

47Distinct people
55Mentions
1Explicit recommenders
12.5KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

AddressSanitizer, ThreadSanitizer, MemorySanitizer

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

Yep. Theoretically it is possible but libasan is not intended for linking or shipping in production. Also stuff like LeakSanitizer[1] actually cannot [1] be used with GDB.…

ho_schi used a recommendation phrase. One indexed comment matches. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 4:59:52 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year55 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-01-15 13:30:51 UTC to 2025-11-23 12:47:34 UTC.

02462016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 1 submissions, 6 comments20162017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 1 submissions, 5 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 2 submissions, 4 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 0 submissions, 6 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 0 submissions, 6 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 0 submissions, 7 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 0 submissions, 7 comments2025

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC716
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC615
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC624
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC514
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC606
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC606
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC707
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC707

From the project README

An excerpt from the repository, fetched Nov 13, 2026.

Read the project’s introduction
sanitizers (Archived) This repository has been archived and is no longer actively maintained. The Sanitizers repository, which includes AddressSanitizer, MemorySanitizer, ThreadSanitizer, LeakSanitizer, and more, is now archived. The core code for these sanitizers resides within the LLVM repository. This repository will be retained for archival purposes, providing access to historical documentation, bugfixes, and helper code. Important: Please do not file new bug reports in this repository. Where to Report Bugs: LLVM: For bugs related to the sanitizer runtimes and instrumentation, please report them to the LLVM Bug Tracker. GCC: For bugs related to the GCC port of the sanitizers, please report them to the GCC Bugzilla. Linux Kernel: For bugs related to Kernel AddressSanitizer (KASAN), Kernel MemorySanitizer (KMSAN), or Kernel ConcurrencySanitizer (KCSAN), please report them through the appropriate Linux kernel bug reporting channels, such as the Linux kernel mailing list. Linux Distributions: For bugs related to compiler issues in specific Linux distributions that are not reproducible in trunk compilers, please report them to the respective distribution's bug tracker (e.g., Debian Bug Tracking System, Red Hat Bugzilla). Apple and Microsoft: For bugs related to the compilers provided by Apple (Xcode) or Microsoft (Visual Studio), please report them through the respective vendor's bug reporting channels. Android NDK: For bugs related to Android, please report them to the NDK issue tracker. Documentation (Archived): AddressSanitizer (detects addressability issues) and LeakSanitizer (detects memory leaks) ThreadSanitizer (detects data races and deadlocks) for C++ and Go MemorySanitizer (detects use of uninitialized memory) HWASAN, or Hardware-assisted AddressSanitizer, a newer variant of AddressSanitizer that consumes much less memory UBSan, or UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer Kernel Sanitizers (Archived Documentation): KASAN KMSAN KCSAN Thank you for your understanding.
Read the full README on GitHub

What Hacker News says

6 sources
Sounds like somebody is playing tricks with virtual addressing, yeah. See BIBOP (1980) [1] for an example, though it is not used literally in current garbage collectors as far as I am aware. Or look at what AddressSanitizer does with its nominal terabytes of “shadow memory”[2]. Chrome has a bewildering variety of low-level stuff in it, to save memory among other things[3], so it wouldn’t surprise me in the least to learn there was virtual-memory tagging somewhere in there, too. [1] https://foldoc.org/Big+bag+of+pages [2] https://github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizerAl... [3] https://v8.dev/blog/oilpan-pointer-compression
In Shadow: New browser engine made almost entirely in JavaScript
> Valgrind is like all the sanitizers (memory, thread, leak, address, undefined) all together, plus performance and memory profilers, all for uninstrumented code. Valgrind as memcheck can do memory and leak and partially do address sanitizer, and when run as helgrind can do thread sanitizer. Valgrind doesn't do -fsanitize=undefined. Undefined -- UBSan -- in particular doesn't overlap with valgrind. Your CPU uses the same instructions for signed and unsigned integer addition (thanks to 2's complement) but UBSan will catch signed integer overflow. UBSan will catch misaligned pointers whether the CPU permits unaligned accesses or not. UBSan will catch integer and float divide by zero, which valgrind ignores because at the CPU level those have defined behaviours (of setting an error flag or whatnot). As for partially doing address sanitizer,
Read the rest
ASan improves its probability of catching invalid pointer arithmetic by intentionally spacing out stack allocations and global variables in a way that the compiler is allowed to do but which valgrind can't because valgrind has to emulate the CPU instructions as they lie. ASan also replaces malloc with its own version that attempts to give different addresses as much as possible so that the use of a freed pointer is maximally likely to not accidentally point to memory which has since been reallocated. Optionally ASan also includes special features like "after running the inliner, malloc a fresh stack for every function call" so that you can really catch stack use after return https://github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizerUs... I'm not deeply familiar with either ThreadSanitizer or Helgrind. The TSan devs claim that Helgrind either runs in "catches too few bugs" mode or "has too many false positives" mode and that they got it just right in TSan. I can't evaluate that claim. https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.c...
In Valgrind recieves a development microgrant from FUTO
Yeah, this article was rather sparse on background, more intended for friends and sponsors and people who have been following along with Vale. A strategy that backfires with general audiences like HN! TL;DR: Vale is like a cleaner C++, and it uses generational references [0] which are similar in spirit to running with ASan [1] turned on. Generational references have a bit of overhead, but it can be removed by regions [2] or more specifically, immutable region borrowing [3]. This helps Vale achieve its goal of being a high-performance language while still remaining memory safe. Hope that helps, happy to answer any other questions =) [0] https://verdagon.dev/blog/generational-references [1] https://github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizer [3] https://verdagon.dev/blog/zero-cost-borrowing-regions-overvi... [4] https://verdagon.dev/
Read the rest
In Vale's first prototype for immutable region borrowing
In addition to what others said, Valgrind is GPL-licensed. That conflicts with the OpenBSD copyright policy (https://www.openbsd.org/policy.html), which says: “The GNU Public License and licenses modeled on it impose the restriction that source code must be distributed or made available for all works that are derivatives of the GNU copyrighted code. While this may superficially look like a noble strategy, it is a condition that is typically unacceptable for commercial use of software. So in practice, it usually ends up hindering free sharing and reuse of code and ideas rather than encouraging it. As a consequence, no additional software bound by the GPL terms will be considered for inclusion into the OpenBSD base system.” As to clang’s Address Sanitizer, that’s under the Apache License v2.0 with LLVM Exceptions (https://github.com/google/
Read the rest
sanitizers/blob/master/LICENSE.TXT), of which the same page says: “The original Apache license was similar to the Berkeley license, but source code published under version 2 of the Apache license is subject to additional restrictions and cannot be included into OpenBSD. In particular, if you use code under the Apache 2 license, some of your rights will terminate if you claim in court that the code violates a patent.”
In OpenBSD: Malloc leak detection available in -current
> And C++ just... doesn't have that many real problems. 70% of security bugs are memory safety issues. That's a lot of real problems. > It has a lot of irks, but the problems people run into are problems that others already solved, a thousand times, over the last half century, in many different ways for many different iterations of the language. People run into memory safety issues more often in new C++ code. https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/memory-safet... https://security.googleblog.com/2021/09/an-update-on-memory-... https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/blob/mas... https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/10/2003112742/-1/-1/0/CSI... https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20pre... https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/research/report-future-... https://alexgaynor.net/2020/may/27/science-on-memory-
Read the rest
In Will Carbon Replace C++?

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