BleedingTooth: Linux Bluetooth Zero-Click Remote Code Execution
4 points · Open discussiongoogle
security-research
C2020–2026
google / security-research
security-research
This project hosts security advisories and their accompanying proof-of-concepts related to research conducted at Google which impact non-Google owned code.
28Distinct people
31Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
4.7KGitHub stars
What to know before exploring
What it is
This project hosts security advisories and their accompanying proof-of-concepts related to research conducted at Google which impact non-Google owned code.
GitHub
Where it is used
No documented product use was verified in the last source check.
What people are saying
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No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.
Also in these discussions
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This week on Hacker News
Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 12:03:30 PM UTC.
No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.
Mentions over time
HN mentions by year31 dated mentions
Observed mentions: 2020-08-10 22:33:00 UTC to 2026-08-14 02:29:26 UTC.
* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.
Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.
View mention counts and date ranges
| Period | Start (UTC) | End (exclusive, UTC) | Mentions | Submissions | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| 2021 | 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| 2022 | 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| 2023 | 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| 2024 | 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 2025 | 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| 2026 (partial) | 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 5 | 0 | 5 |
From the project README
An excerpt from the repository, fetched Nov 13, 2026.
Read the project’s introduction
Security Research
This project hosts security advisories and their accompanying
proof-of-concepts related to research conducted at Google which impact
non-Google owned code.
We believe that vulnerability disclosure is a two-way street. Vendors,
as well as researchers, must act responsibly. This is why Google adheres
to a 90-day disclosure deadline. We notify vendors of vulnerabilities
immediately, with details shared in public with the defensive community
after 90 days, or sooner if the vendor releases a fix.
You can read up on our full policy at:
https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/.
Advisories
The disclosure of vulnerabilities are all in the form of security
advisories, which can be browsed in the Security
Advisories
page.
License & Patents
The advisories and patches posted here are free and open source.
See LICENSE for
further details.
Contributing
The easiest way to contribute to our security research projects is to
correct the patches when you see mistakes.
Please read up our
Contribution
policy.
Read the full README on GitHubWhat Hacker News says
4 sourcesYou can totally do asynchronous negotiation, and PGP has plenty of examples of it going wrong.
Edit: here's a beautiful recent example of in-band negotiation going wrong in an encryption at rest scheme.
https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisor...
In Cryptography Dispatches: Registries Considered HarmfulmacOS is vulnerable to SpectreRSB/ret2spec
2 points · Open discussionThe last vulnerability [1] is super cool, as it allows to decrypt AES-GCM ciphertexts using an AES-CBC padding oracle!
The exploit is very efficient and fits in a tweet:
1. Take C = E(K, IV) \xor P from GCM encryption
2. Make a guess of P, send (IV \ xor PADDING) || (C \xor P_guess) to the CBC oracle where PADDING is a fixed constant. If the oracle returns that the padding is correct, P_guess is correct. Otherwise make another guess.
The root cause of the issue runs pretty deep. It's a class of crypto vulnerabilities we called "in-band protocol negotiation". That is, the ciphertext contains protocol-related parameters that determine how it should be decrypted. The JWT standard has this issue, which has led to countless "alg": "none" vulnerabilities. JWT is not alone, this mistake is presented in many other libraries or standards.
I wrote
Read the rest
about how we avoid this issue in Tink [2] [3]:
>2/ A key in Tink contains not only the raw key material, but also all necessary parameters. It is equivalent to the result of a handshake. Before any data encryption can take place, both sides have to reach an agreement not only on a raw key, but also how to use that key to encrypt data. Since a key in Tink contains all parameters, Tink does not require in-band ciphersuite negotiation. That is no ciphertext in Tink contains any other metadata aside from a key ID.
>This design sounds so simple but I've seen people get this wrong all the time. For example, the root cause of many embarrassing vulnerabilities in JWT [1] is in-band ciphersuite negotiation. That is, a JWT contains an alg field that dictates how the receiver should process it. This alg field should rather be included as part of the key.
>JWT is not the only standard making this mistake. Many crypto libraries only ask users for the raw key material. This means the parameters are either implicitly assumed or under specified. Aside from the aforementioned vulnerabilities, this can also lead to key confusion, cross-protocol key reuse and make it hard to rotate keys or change algorithms.
>To the best of my knowledge, Tink is the only high-level library that gets this right.
[1] https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisor...
[2] https://github.com/google/tink
[3] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23215652