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syzkaller
Go2017–2025
google / syzkaller

syzkaller

syzkaller is an unsupervised coverage-guided kernel fuzzer

19Distinct people
21Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
6.4KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

syzkaller is an unsupervised coverage-guided kernel fuzzer

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 6:28:55 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year21 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2017-01-25 20:36:30 UTC to 2025-08-24 04:38:52 UTC.

02462017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 2 submissions, 5 comments20172018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2025

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC725
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

4 sources
> Why does the Linux kernel project continue to release code with flaws like this that can be found with automated tools? Because they have no other option, it's a fuzzer. Therefore, it may take a long time(up to universe heat death) for it to finally exercise the path that causes the issue. And the kernel has a pretty enormous footprint. Fuzzers never really terminate, so it is not like you can plug it on a CI/CD system and wait for reports. > The process of reproducing one crash may take from a few minutes up to an hour depending on whether the crash is easily reproducible or non-reproducible at all. That's for one known crash. But otherwise it will be running 24/7 (across multiple VMs!) looking for issues. More details here: https://github.com/google/syzkaller
In Bad Binder: Android In-the-Wild Exploit
For sure, implementing Linux is no easy task, and there is no magic bullet. For compatibility testing, we have extensive system call unit tests [1] and also run many open source test suites. Language runtime tests (e.g., Python, Go, etc) are particularly useful. We also perform continuous fuzzing with Syzkaller [2]. > how do you implement features that ostensibly require calls to the OS anyways? gVisor's kernel is a user-space program, so it can and does make system calls to the host OS. Some examples: * An application blocks trying to read(2) from a pipe. gVisor ultimately implements blocking by waiting on a Go channel. The Go runtime will ultimately implement this with a futex(2) call to the host OS. * An application reads from a file that is ultimately backed by a file on the host (provided by the Gofer [3]). This will result in a prea
Read the rest
d(2) system call to the host. The purpose here isn't to avoid the host completely (that's not possible), but to limit exposure to the host. gVisor can implement all the parts of Linux it does on a much smaller subset of host system calls. Anything we don't use is blocked by a second-level seccomp sandbox around the kernel. e.g., the kernel cannot make obscure system calls, or even open files or create sockets on the host (those operations are controlled by an external agent). [1] https://github.com/google/gvisor/tree/master/test/syscalls/l... [2] https://github.com/google/syzkaller [3] https://gvisor.dev/docs/architecture_guide/overview/
In GKE Sandbox: Independent operating system kernel to each container

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