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GoogleChrome
ip-protection
OPEN SOURCE2023–2025
GoogleChrome / ip-protection · Archived

ip-protection

Discover this repository through its Hacker News conversations.

12Distinct people
12Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
393GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

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What it is

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Where it is used

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What people are saying

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No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

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This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 1:49:46 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month12 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2023-10-23 20:14:42 UTC to 2025-02-17 10:41:37 UTC.

0123452023-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 commentsOct 20232023-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2023-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsJun 20242024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 commentsFeb 2025

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Oct 20232023-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-11-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Nov 20232023-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-12-01 00:00:00 UTC303
Dec 20232023-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20242024-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20242024-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20242024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20242024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC110
Jun 20242024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Jul 20242024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20242024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20242024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20242024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20242024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20242024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20252025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-03-01 00:00:00 UTC514

What Hacker News says

12 sources
>Hi, connections through the proxies are encrypted multiple times to prevent Google from being able to access browsing data. In particular, the connection client-website is end-to-end encrypted, and so are the client-proxyA and client-proxyB connections. Because of this, the proxyA (operated by Google) will only be able to see the client IP address but won't be able to know which website is visited. The proxyB (operated by a partner) will be able to see the hostname of the website, but it won't know which client IP is accessing it. Neither proxy can see the URL nor the data due to the end-to-end encryption. With this design, no one - not even Google - can see who visited what website. Regarding log retention for the very limited information that we do have, let me confirm things internally and circle back. https://github.com/GoogleChrome/
Read the rest
ip-protection/issues/34 Disclosure: I work at Google, but not on IP protection.
In Critics say new Google rules put profits over privacy
Seems like a step in the right direction. There are a bunch of considerations: - It's only a proposal - It only applies to domains in what they call the Masked Domain List (MDL), see [1] - The masked IP will be in the same country and same "coarse location" as your actual IP - It applies "when users are signed into their Google account in the Chrome browser before starting an Incognito session." 1. https://github.com/GoogleChrome/ip-protection?tab=readme-ov-...
In Chrome browser bringing an IP address privacy tool to Incognito
As justinclift points out elsewhere in this discussion, the article may have misreported that: > We are considering using 2 hops for improved privacy. A second proxy would be run by an external CDN, while Google runs the first hop. This ensures that neither proxy can see both the client IP address and the destination. — https://github.com/GoogleChrome/ip-protection#core-requireme... If they choose to go ahead with the second hop it would be the same as Apple’s approach. But it sounds like this has not been committed to yet.
In Google dragged to UK watchdog over Chrome's upcoming IP address cloaking
Reading the front page the of GitHub repo with the Chrome "IP Protection" source code, it has this worrying statement: We are considering using 2 hops for improved privacy. A second proxy would be run by an external CDN ... https://github.com/GoogleChrome/ip-protection "Considering" means "we're thinking about it, but it's in no way final". Sounds like Google could implement a proxy solution but decide the 2nd hop for improved privacy isn't needed after all. Or make it optional, defaulting to OFF, etc.
In Google dragged to UK watchdog over Chrome's upcoming IP address cloaking

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