SESeirdy·Dec 16, 2021Submission
8 points · Open discussionGrapheneOS
hardened_malloc
C2019–2025
GrapheneOS / hardened_malloc
hardened_malloc
Hardened allocator designed for modern systems. It has integration into Android's Bionic libc and can be used externally with musl and glibc as a dynamic library for use on other Linux-based platforms. It will gain more portability/integration over time.
11Distinct people
15Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
2.1KGitHub stars
What to know before exploring
What it is
Hardened allocator designed for modern systems. It has integration into Android's Bionic libc and can be used externally with musl and glibc as a dynamic library for use on other Linux-based platforms. It will gain more portability/integration over time.
GitHub
Where it is used
No documented product use was verified in the last source check.
What people are saying
No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.
No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.
Also in these discussions
- grapheneos/auditor · linked in 3 of the same discussions
Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.
This week on Hacker News
Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 2:59:58 PM UTC.
No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.
Mentions over time
HN mentions by year15 dated mentions
Observed mentions: 2019-06-10 19:43:28 UTC to 2025-11-08 07:02:17 UTC.
Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.
View mention counts and date ranges
| Period | Start (UTC) | End (exclusive, UTC) | Mentions | Submissions | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| 2020 | 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 2021 | 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| 2022 | 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 2023 | 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2024 | 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| 2025 | 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 3 | 0 | 3 |
What Hacker News says
3 sourceslast time I checked the Debian and Gentoo hardening guides relro/pie were standard practice. I can't remember the time we didn't use it and I've been around for a minute.
this is my template for most Linux projects (except when "something else" is needed :)) ... please don't copy paste without certainty of what it does:
CFLAGS_BASE := -c -O2 -Wall -Werror -Wpedantic -pipe $(CFLAGS)
CFLAGS_HARD := -fPIE -Wformat-security -fstack-protector-strong --param=ssp-buffer-size=4 -fcf-protection -Wimplicit-fallthrough -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
CFLAGS_DEBUG := -g3 -gdwarf-2
CFLAGS_RELEASE := -s -fomit-frame-pointer -march=native
LDFLAGS := -Wl,-z,now -Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,defs -Wl,-pie -Wl,--no-copy-dt-needed-entries
LDFLAGS_HMALLOC := -L/usr/local/lib -lhardened_malloc # see https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc
don't get security a
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dvise from random strangers like me on HN, also don't forget to always ship code with an apparmor profile and lock down the systemd unit file with seccomp filters and other hardening options (even RH is just another IBM company now, they have excellent docs on this and some impressive appsec/security people on their payroll https://www.redhat.com/sysadmin/mastering-systemd). Also after learning about systemd hardening this was the time I stopped worrying and learned to love systemd. (actually just joking I still hate systemd with a passion)
I don't think Zig is going to be memory safe in practice, unless they add a GC or introduce a Rust-like system. All of the mitigations I've seen come from that language--for example, quarantine--are things that we've had for years in hardened memory allocators for C++ like Chromium PartitionAlloc [1] and GrapheneOS hardened_malloc [2]. These have been great mitigations, but have not been effective in achieving memory safety.
Put another way: Anything you could do in the malloc/free model that Zig uses right now is something you could do in C++, or C for that matter. Maybe there's some super-hardened malloc design yet to be found that achieves memory safety in practice for C++. But we've been looking for decades and haven't found such a thing--except for one family of techniques broadly known as garbage collection (which, IMO, should be on
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the table for systems programming; Chromium did it as part of the Oilpan project and it works well there).
There is always a temptation to think "mitigations will eliminate bugs this time around"! But, frankly, at this point I feel that pushing mitigations as a viable alternative to memory safety for new code is dangerous (as opposed to pushing mitigations for existing code, which is very valuable work). We've been developing mitigations for 40 years and they have not eliminated the vulnerabilities. There's little reason to think that if we just try harder we will succeed.
[1]: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/HEAD/base/a...
[2]: https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc